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BRETT MCDONNELL, HARI M. OSOFSKY, JACQUELINE PEEL & ANITA 
FOERSTER 
Corporate and securities law tools are increasingly being used to 
address climate change. Disclosure of climate-related business risks and 
shareholder proposals and engagement have grown in the United States and 
globally, as have broader efforts to use these tools to address environmental 
and social issues. Emerging fiduciary duty suits in other jurisdictions claim 
that corporate boards have failed to monitor and manage climate-related 
risks adequately. However, legal scholarship has failed to assess whether 
these efforts are actually changing corporate behavior. This Article draws 
on original interviews with corporate leaders and investors in the United 
States and Australia to assess the effectiveness of corporate and securities 
law tools in addressing climate change. It finds that while disclosures and 
shareholder proposals related to climate change have been extensive, they 
have not yet changed corporate behavior much, if at all. The Article 
therefore proposes a multi-pronged approach to increase the future 
effectiveness of disclosure, shareholder proposals and engagement, and 
fiduciary duty. This study offers new insights into the old debate over how 
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BRETT MCDONNELL,* HARI M. OSOFSKY,** JACQUELINE PEEL*** & ANITA 
FOERSTER**** 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2017, the shareholders of three major fossil fuel companies, including 
ExxonMobil, approved proposals requiring that the companies produce 
detailed reports concerning climate change and their businesses.1 
Shareholders called for these analyses to incorporate the potential impact on 
the companies of the Paris Climate Agreement’s goal of limiting global 
warming to well below two degrees Celsius.2 In 2018, the Sustainability 
Accounting Standards Board published a set of standards to guide voluntary 
reporting on a wide range of topics, including climate change, with guidance 
particularized to the needs of seventy-seven different industries.3 
These are two examples among many of initiatives being undertaken in 
the United States and around the world to use securities and corporate law 
tools—disclosure, shareholder proposals and engagement, and fiduciary 
 
* Professor and Dorsey & Whitney Chair, University of Minnesota Law School; Director, Institute 
for Law and Economics, University of Minnesota Law School. This research received funding support 
from the Australian Research Council Discovery Project grant on “Devising a Legal Blueprint for 
Corporate Energy Transition” (2016–20). We are grateful to Rebekkah Markey-Towler and Maggie 
Kolcon for assistance with referencing for this Article and to numerous colleagues, in the United States 
and Australia, who provided helpful comments and feedback on earlier drafts. We would particularly 
like to thank David Barnden, Madison Condon, Katrina Fischer Kuh, Michael Gerrard, Joan Heminway, 
Claire Hill, Rosemary Langford, Ann Lipton, John Matheson, Elizabeth Pollman, Ian Ramsay, Usha 
Rodrigues, Paul Rubin, Hillary Sale, Omari Simmons, Michael Vanderbergh, Gina Warren, and the 
participants in the 2020 AALS Environmental Law and Natural Resources and Energy Law Sections 
Food, Environmental and Natural Resources Works in Progress Session and a Faculty Works in Progress 
session at the University of Minnesota Law School. 
** Dean, Penn State Law and School of International Affairs; Distinguished Professor of Law, 
Professor of International Affairs, Professor of Geography, The Pennsylvania State University. 
*** Professor, University of Melbourne, School of Law, Australia; Director, Melbourne Climate 
Futures and Associate Director of the Centre for Resources, Energy and Environmental Law. 
 
**** Senior Lecturer, Department of Business Law and Taxation, Monash University, Australia. 
1 Cydney Posner, Are Shareholder Proposals on Climate Change Becoming a Thing?, HARV. L. 
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 21, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/06/21/are-
shareholder-proposals-on-climate-change-becoming-a-thing/ (discussing these three resolutions). 
2 Article 2(1)(a) of the 2015 Paris Agreement calls on parties to hold global average temperature 
rises “to well below 2℃ above pre-industrial levels” and to pursue efforts to contain temperature rises to 
no more than 1.5 degrees Celsius. Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104 [hereinafter Paris Agreement]. 
3 Download SASB Standards, SASB, https://www.sasb.org/standards-overview/download-current-
standards/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2021). The Board is one of many organizations that has emerged to create 
voluntary sustainability disclosure standards. Infra notes 110–14 and accompanying text. 
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duty litigation—to pressure corporations to respond more quickly to the 
challenges of climate change in their business plans and investments.4 
Companies increasingly provide sustainability disclosures in their annual 
reporting and on their websites, though the quality of the information varies.5 
The number of shareholder proposals on climate change, and votes in 
support of them, continue to grow.6 And lawsuits asserting fraud in 
disclosure or a failure to monitor and manage climate change-related risks7 
adequately have begun to emerge globally.8  
These tools are not only being used to address climate change. That topic 
is just one of a number of environmental and social issues9 that new 
disclosure frameworks and shareholder proposals are targeting. Other 
common issues include gender pay equity, workplace diversity, and political 
and lobbying expenditures by corporations.10 The initiatives addressing 
these issues form a new phase in a cycle of corporate governance debates 
raising fundamental questions of corporate law:11 In whose interests should 
 
4 Disclosure involves companies providing information about climate change risks and activities. 
Shareholder proposals involve someone who has a share in the company bringing a proposal to be voted 
on by shareholders demanding that the company be responsive to climate change. Fiduciary duty suits 
claim that companies have a fiduciary duty to address the risks of climate change. For an analysis of 
these tools, see generally Hari M. Osofsky, Jacqueline Peel, Brett McDonnell & Anita Foerster, Energy 
Re-Investment, 94 IND. L.J. 595 (2019) [hereinafter Osofsky et al., Energy Re-Investment]. 
5 JIM COBURN & JACKIE COOK, CERES, COOL RESPONSE: THE SEC & CORPORATE CLIMATE 
CHANGE REPORTING 11–12 (2014); SOL KWON, IRRC INST., STATE OF SUSTAINABILITY AND 
INTEGRATED REPORTING 2018, at 33 (2018) [hereinafter KWON, STATE OF SUSTAINABILITY]; U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-20-530, PUBLIC COMPANIES: DISCLOSURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL, 
SOCIAL, AND GOVERNANCE FACTORS AND OPTIONS TO ENHANCE THEM 18 (2020) [hereinafter PUBLIC 
COMPANIES REPORT]. 
6 Press Release, Conf. Bd., In 2020, Companies Will Continue to Face Pressure to Diversify Their 
Boards, Address Pay Gaps, and Expand Political Contribution Disclosure (Dec. 17, 2019), 
https://conference-board.org/press/environmental-social-policies-of-corporations. 
7 We use the term “climate change-related risks” or “climate risk” in this Article to refer to the two 
principal categories of risk that climate change may pose for businesses that have been identified by the 
Taskforce on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD): physical risks, i.e., risks posed by climate 
change to the assets, operations, and supply chains of a company, and transition risks, i.e., risks 
associated with the transition to a low-carbon economy, which can include risks due to new regulatory 
requirements, potential litigation, technology change, or reputational or brand damage. TASK FORCE ON 
CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES, FINAL REPORT: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON 
CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES 5–6 (2017) [hereinafter TCFD, FINAL REPORT]. Our focus 
in this Article is primarily on transition risk, as we are concerned with how companies are responding to 
the challenge of transitioning business practices for a low-carbon economy. 
8 Infra note 299 and accompanying text. 
9 Along with governance issues, these sorts of issues are frequently referred to as ESG matters. 
PUBLIC COMPANIES REPORT, supra note 5, at 1. We will also frequently use the term “sustainability” to 
cover the range of environmental and social topics currently being addressed in corporate governance circles. 
10 Marc Treviño, 2019 Proxy Season Review: Part 1—Rule 14a-8 Shareholder Proposals, HARV. 
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (July 26, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/07/26/2019-
proxy-season-review-part-1-rule-14a-8-shareholder-proposals/. 
11 C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective 
for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77, 77–78 (2002); Brett McDonnell, The Corrosion 
Critique of Benefit Corporations 6–9 (U. Minn. L. Sch. Working Paper, Paper No. 19-24, 2019), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3450747. 
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corporations be governed? How can we ensure that corporations best 
advance the public good?12 However, amid all this activity and debate, the 
critical question remains of whether this new activism is actually changing 
corporate behavior.  
This Article analyzes whether corporate and securities law can impact 
corporate behavior with respect to climate change, drawing on original 
interviews with corporate managers, investors, regulators, and other relevant 
stakeholders in the United States and Australia.13 Through the interviews, 
we sought a deeper understanding of how different actors perceive 
climate-related uses of securities law tools and how companies are 
responding. This included an effort to understand how, if at all, voluntary 
disclosure and shareholder proposals and engagement have succeeded so far 
at getting companies to address climate change-related risks.14  
Our findings indicate these corporate and financial law initiatives have 
not yet had a significant impact on underlying corporate behavior in ways 
that substantively affect the allocation of resources and capital to address 
climate change.15 However, those interviewed generally accept that even 
under corporate law models focused on enhancing long-term shareholder 
value (rather than considering other key stakeholders and the general 
public), companies will need to pay greater attention to policy issues such 
as climate change that are likely to have serious effects on financial 
performance.16 Importantly, compared to the situation just five years ago, 
many more companies and investors in both countries now understand 
climate change to pose financial risks for businesses.17  
Based on these findings, this Article proposes pathways for enhancing 
the effectiveness of corporate and financial law tools.18 Australia provides a 
particularly helpful comparative example for the United States in developing 
these strategies because of its legal, socio-political, and economic 
similarities. Drawing from the interviews and evolving use of the tools in 
practice, this Article considers how they could be used more effectively. In 
doing so, it recognizes the ongoing debate in corporate law about whether 
corporations should focus only on enhancing value for their shareholders or 
also consider other stakeholders and the general public.19 This Article argues 
that even if a model focused on enhancing long-term shareholder value is 
 
12 Infra Section I.A. 
13 A total of thirty-eight interviews were undertaken, fourteen with stakeholders in the United States 
and twenty-four with stakeholders in Australia. Additional details of different groups of participants in 
the interviews are below. Infra notes 99–100 and accompanying text. A separate online appendix 
provides further information on the interview methodology and analysis. 
14 Infra notes 99–100 
15 Infra Parts II–IV. 
16 Infra Parts II–IV. 
17 Infra Parts II–IV. 
18 Infra Part V. 
19 Infra Section I.A. 
 
340 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:2 
not ideally suited to addressing problems like climate change, working 
within its structure—while exploring longer-term reform—is most likely to 
be effective in our current political environment.20 For each tool, we outline 
what truly deep reform to create stakeholder-focused corporations might 
look like, but also suggest more modest reforms within the prevailing 
long-term shareholder value paradigm that have better prospects of success, 
while nudging corporations in a more stakeholder-focused direction.  
In the case of disclosure, a stakeholder focus would suggest 
comprehensive new mandatory disclosure rules,21 along the lines of what 
has emerged in the European Union (EU),22 while more modest reform 
would entail the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) mandating 
more specific disclosure of items related to climate change that have a 
material impact on financial results and adopting one of the new private 
standards for disclosure to provide greater uniformity.23  
Regarding shareholder actions and engagement, a stakeholder focus 
would empower persons with environmental expertise at the board level or 
through advisory councils, while modest reform would bring SEC treatment 
of proposals concerning greenhouse gas emissions and Department of Labor 
guidance on the duty of retirement plan fiduciaries back to its approach 
under the Obama Administration. We also recommend a variety of types of 
 
20 Infra Part V.  
21 See Ann M. Lipton, Not Everything Is About Investors: The Case for Mandatory Stakeholder 
Disclosure, 37 YALE J. ON REGUL. 499, 503 (2020) (recommending a legally mandated disclosure system 
for large companies, which would disclose financial information as well as information regarding 
corporate governance, environmental impact, labor relationships, and consumer protection); see also Jill 
E. Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107 GEO. L.J. 923, 928 (2019) (discussing the 
2014 EU Directive on the Disclosure of Non-Financial and Diversity Information that requires specific 
sustainability disclosures); Cynthia A. Williams & Jill E. Fisch, Petition to SEC for Rulemaking on 
Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) Disclosure, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE 
(Oct. 9, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/10/09/petition-to-sec-for-rulemaking-on-environmen 
tal-social-and-governance-esg-disclosure/ (petitioning the SEC to engage in notice and comment rule-
making regarding disclosure rules for environmental, social and governance concerns). 
22 The EU’s Non-Financial Reporting Directive requires large undertakings across the EU to 
include a non-financial statement in the management report containing information on environmental, 
social and employee, human rights, and bribery and anti-corruption related issues. Council Directive 
2014/95, art. 6, 2014 O.J. (L 330) 1, 2–3 (EU). In June 2017, the European Commission published non-
binding guidelines on non-financial reporting to help companies provide high quality disclosure of 
environmental, social, and governance-related information. Council Directive 2017/4234, arts. 1–2, 2017 
O.J. (C 215) 1, 2–3 (EC). Further, in June 2019, the European Commission published non-binding 
guidelines specifically on reporting climate-related information. The guidelines were developed as part 
of the European Commission’s 2018 Action Plan on Financing Sustainable Growth, which aims to foster 
sustainable investment, manage financial risks associated with climate change and other environmental 
and social problems, and encourage transparent and long-term focused financial activity. The guidelines 
supplement the existing 2014 Directive and non-binding guidelines, and they integrate the 
recommendations of the TCFD. Council Directive 2019/4490, art. 1, 2019 O.J. (C 209) 1, 2–3 (EC).  
23 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. The SEC could require issuers to either comply with 
those standards or explain why they are not material for their business. Climate change disclosure should 
include analysis of how world governments responding to a two degree Celsius or lower scenario as 
required by the Paris Agreement would affect the disclosing company. See infra Part V. 
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shareholder proposals that climate change activists may want to pursue, 
some of which are already being tried in the United States and Australia but 
could be expanded, and others of which are new suggestions based on our 
interview findings.24  
With respect to fiduciary duty, we note the immense obstacles that a 
breach of duty climate change suit faces under governing law, but also draw 
attention to the emergence of such suits in other countries and comment on 
their potential application in a U.S. context. Australia provides a pertinent 
comparison here with authoritative legal opinions,25 endorsed by Australian 
national regulators,26 predicting that litigation against directors for failure to 
consider climate-related risk “is likely to be only a matter of time.”27 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides conceptual framing for 
the rest of the Article by situating the use of corporate and financial law to 
address climate change within debates in both corporate and environmental 
law over the role of corporations. It also introduces the value of comparing 
the United States and Australia in this context. Parts II through IV review 
legal and institutional developments and present our interview results and 
comparisons with Australia for each tool, with Part II covering disclosure, 
III covering engagement, and IV covering fiduciary duty. Part V provides 
suggestions for reforms.  
I. THE ROLE OF CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAW IN ADDRESSING 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
 In the past decade or so, the shape of corporate governance for U.S. 
 
24 Useful proposals include limits on lobbying and political spending, requiring at least one director 
with relevant environmental expertise, and requiring a more elaborate and formalized process for 
consulting with environmental, community, and other stakeholder groups on climate change, as well as 
other sustainability issues. See infra Section III.B. 
25 See NOEL HUTLEY & SEBASTIAN HARTFORD DAVIS, CTR. FOR POL’Y DEV. & FUTURE BUS. 
COUNCIL, CLIMATE CHANGE AND DIRECTOR’S DUTIES: MEMORANDUM OF OPINION  (2016) [hereinafter 
HUTLEY & HARTFORD DAVIS, 2016 MEMORANDUM], https://cpd.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/L
egal-Opinion-on-Climate-Change-and-Directors-Duties.pdf (considering the likelihood of physical 
“climate change risks” and concluding that such risks would likely be foreseeable in litigation against a 
company director); NOEL HUTLEY & SEBASTIAN HARTFORD DAVIS, CTR. FOR POL’Y DEV, CLIMATE 
CHANGE AND DIRECTORS’ DUTIES: SUPPLEMENTARY MEMORANDUM OF OPINION (2019) [hereinafter 
HUTLEY & HARTFORD DAVIS, 2019 MEMORANDUM], https://cpd.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/
Noel-Hutley-SC-and-Sebastian-Hartford-Davis-Opinion-2019-and-2016_pdf. 
26 See, e.g., John Price, Comm’r, Austl. Sec. & Invs. Comm’n, Keynote Address at the Centre for 
Policy Development: Financing a Sustainable Economy (June 18, 2018) (encouraging directors to lead 
corporate governance reform to manage issues like climate change and noting that “directors would do 
well to carefully consider the memorandum of opinion by Noel Hutley QC and Sebastian Hartford Davis 
on climate change and directors duties . . . that, in our view, the opinion appears legally sound and is 
reflective of our understanding of the position under the prevailing case law in Australia in so far as 
directors’ duties are concerned”); Sean Hughes & Cathie Armour, Comm’rs, Austl. Sec. & Invs. 
Comm’n, Address at ANU Climate Update (Feb.–Mar. 2019) (highlighting that directors who fail to 
consider climate change risks now could be liable for breaching fiduciary duties in the future, again 
favorably referring to the Hutley and Hartford Davis memorandum). 
27 HUTLEY & HARTFORD DAVIS, 2016 MEMORANDUM, supra note 25, at para. 51. 
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public corporations has altered dramatically, with initiatives surrounding 
climate change playing a central role. Environmental, Social, and Governance 
(ESG) activism has exploded as a major part of shareholder formal and 
informal engagement.28 Multiple disclosure initiatives, focused on climate 
change in particular and sustainability more generally, have expanded, with 
sustainability reports becoming a standard part of corporate disclosure.29  
These developments can be situated within a long-running and evolving 
debate over the nature and purpose of business corporations. They also 
reflect growing social and political recognition of the urgency of addressing 
climate change. The developments described here are taking a particular 
form within the United States, but they are occurring at public companies 
around the world as well, with close parallels in similarly situated carbon 
economies such as Australia. 
This Part frames the rest of the Article by providing background on 
debates within corporate governance and environmentalist circles concerning 
the relationship between climate change and corporations. Section A 
describes the evolving debate over the nature and purpose of United States 
corporations. Section B explores why environmentalists concerned about 
climate change have turned to using these securities and corporate law tools 
and their varying views of them. Section C discusses features of company 
law and governance in Australia and discusses some benefits from 
comparing emerging practices in these two similarly situated countries. 
A. The Corporate Governance Debate 
 The proper purpose of corporations, especially public corporations, and 
the related question of to whom the fiduciary duties of corporate directors 
and officers do and should run, have been a source of several cycles of public 
and scholarly debate over the past century. The locus classicus of this debate 
is an exchange between Adolf Berle and Merrick Dodd in the Harvard Law 
Review in the early 1930s. Berle, a major New Deal figure and co-author of 
the book first analyzing the separation of ownership and control in public 
corporations, argued that directors and officers have a duty to protect the 
interests of shareholders.30 Dodd countered that their duty runs to the 
corporation more broadly, including the interests of other stakeholders and 
 
28 Tamas Barko, Martijn Cremers & Luc Renneboog, Shareholder Engagement on Environmental, 
Social, and Governance Performance 1 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Finance Working Paper, Paper No. 
509/2017, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2977219. 
29 Hans B. Christensen, Luzi Hail & Christian Leuz, Adoption of CSR and Sustainability Reporting 
Standards: Economic Analysis and Review 30 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26169, 
2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3439179. 
30 A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931); A. 
A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1365 
(1932). 
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the public in general.31  
The managerialist ideology of the fifties seemed to reflect a victory for 
Dodd’s view, as Berle recognized.32 But in the seventies and eighties, Berle’s 
shareholder conception became dominant. This was driven by the rise of 
corporate raiders who launched hostile takeovers of poorly run businesses. A 
wave of economists and legal scholars argued that a focus on shareholder 
value would maximize the general welfare, at least within properly 
functioning markets constrained by laws that countered major external 
effects.33 Milton Friedman made the case most famously in a short and 
elegant essay in the New York Times Magazine.34 Some scholars, though, 
criticized this view, asserting the broader stakeholder vision of Dodd, and 
many states adopted corporate constituency statutes that allowed directors 
and officers to consider the interests of a variety of stakeholders, including 
employees, creditors, customers, the environment, and the community.35  
In the last two decades or so, two different sorts of shareholder activism 
have embodied the tension between the shareholder and stakeholder 
positions. On the one hand, a group of equity funds have followed a strategy 
of identifying poorly performing companies, buying up a substantial share 
position in them, and then pressuring management to take actions that the 
activists believe will increase returns to shareholders.36 On the other hand is 
the growth of the type of ESG activism discussed here, which addresses 
 
31 E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 
1147–48 (1932). 
32 ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY: A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 8 (1959). 
33 For some of these scholars’ insights, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 36–38 (1991); Roberta Romano, A Cautionary Note on 
Drawing Lessons from Comparative Corporate Law, 102 YALE L.J. 2021, 2031 (1993); Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 910–12 (2005); Mark J. 
Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 
2065 (2001); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 
97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550 (2003). 
34 Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine--The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its 
Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32. 
35 For these criticisms, see Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 278 (1999); LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW 
PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 104–05 (2012); 
LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA’S NEWEST EXPORT 185–86 (2001); 
KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS & PROGRESSIVE 
POSSIBILITIES 228–29 (2006); David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013, 
1013–14 (2013). 
36 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund 
Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1093 (2015) (discussing whether interventions by activist hedge 
funds have long-term detrimental effects on companies and shareholders and concluding that there is not 
sufficient support for that theory); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact 
of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 553–54 (2016) (“[O]ur primary 
concern is . . . with the possibility that the increasing rate of hedge fund activism is beginning to compel 
corporate boards and managements to forego long-term investments (particularly in R&D) in favor of a 
short-term policy of maximizing shareholder payout in the form of dividends and stock buybacks.”). 
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environmental and social concerns.  
Many proponents of ESG proposals and disclosure do not take a firm 
position on the stakeholder side of the debate. Instead, they argue that a focus 
on long-term shareholder value is consistent with, and indeed requires, 
aggressive consideration of a variety of stakeholder interests. Typical of this 
attempt to reconcile shareholders and stakeholders through a focus on the 
long run are recent annual letters from Larry Fink, the CEO of BlackRock, 
one of the Big Three family of mutual funds that has come to play a huge 
role in the ownership of public corporations.37 In his recent letter to CEOs, 
Fink specifically focused on climate change: “Our investment conviction is 
that sustainability- and climate-integrated portfolios can provide better risk-
adjusted returns to investors. And with the impact of sustainability on 
investment returns increasing, we believe that sustainable investing is the 
strongest foundation for client portfolios going forward.”38 
Fink is far from alone in this view. A large number of both investors and 
companies have publicly taken similar positions. For an example of the view 
expressed from the company side, consider this statement from the 
Sustainability Report of Prologis, the highest-rated U.S. corporation on the 
Global 100 Most Sustainable Companies list:39 “Our ESG program is good 
business—benefiting our customers, investors, communities and employees. 
Good ESG practices support our corporate commitment to enduring excellence 
and advance our longstanding focus on exemplary customer service.”40 
Why might a long-term focus help reconcile shareholder with 
stakeholder interests? Several sorts of arguments are made in the context of 
climate change. For many companies, climate change already is imposing 
costs that require action, and for others it presents new business 
opportunities. Another reason companies may need to focus on climate 
change now is the threat of potentially much stronger regulation in the 
relatively near future. Particularly for companies in energy and related 
fields, which must make long-term investment decisions, the profitability of 
those investments may shift dramatically with potential new regulations.41 
Reputational concerns may also drive companies to consider 
stakeholder interests.42 The more weight decisionmakers give to the future 
 
37 Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2020 Letter to CEOs: A Fundamental Reshaping of Finance, 
BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2020-larry-fink-ceo-letter (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2021). 
38 Id. 
39 2019 Global 100 Results, CORP. KNIGHTS (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.corporateknights.com/r
eports/2019-global-100/2019-global-100-results-15481153/. 
40 PROLOGIS, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT: A CULTURE OF RESILIENCE 4 (2017), https://prologis.get
bynder.com/m/10c8bf7b4af3adf1/original/Prologis_2017_SustainabilityReport_180530_FINAL.pdf. 
41 See Madison Condon, Externalities and the Common Owner, 95 WASH. L. REV. 1, 40 (2020) 
(discussing effects of long-term climate prediction assessments on investors). 
42 See Claire A. Hill, Caremark as Soft Law, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 681, 694 (2018) [hereinafter Hill, 
Caremark as Soft Law] (“[C]ompliance programs go far beyond what is needed to avoid lawbreaking, 
and what directors do… goes far beyond what is needed to avoid liability, incorporating, among other 
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profitability of the business, the more important reputation becomes. Many 
consumers increasingly choose what companies to patronize, or not 
patronize, based in part on their sense of how well those companies conform 
to their personal values.43 Reputation with potential employees also matters 
to many businesses, and highly-skilled employees may increasingly care 
about climate change.44 However, even if all of the concerns above are 
correct, one must also make a case for why managers are not already fully 
taking them into account and hence why shareholder activism or litigation 
could help, e.g., by addressing agency costs or market imperfections.  
Engagement with stakeholders may also have informational benefits. 
Scientists and other environmentalists who are deeply engaged in and 
knowledgeable about the issue of climate change may be able to help 
companies evaluate potential effects from climate change. Employees and 
customers may have helpful ideas about how a company can reform its 
operations. Local community leaders and organizations may help businesses 
become aware of environmental impacts they are having in the places where 
they are located. 
A further effect, beyond a long-term focus on the returns of individual 
companies, may reconcile shareholder and stakeholder interests. Many 
institutional investors, the owners of most shares of public companies, are 
highly diversified in their share ownership. They thus care about the effect 
that the behavior of one company may have on the long-term profits of their 
other portfolio companies. Even if a utility company may generate greater 
profits by building more fossil fuel plants, if the resulting greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions hurt the profits of other companies more, a diversified 
investor will not want to see those plants built. This portfolio effect helps 
internalize major externalities such as GHG emissions.45 
 
things, concerns about reputation, both theirs and their company's.”); Claire A. Hill, Marshalling 
Reputation to Minimize Problematic Business Conduct, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1193, 1194, 1204 nn.43 & 45 
(2019) (exploring corporate motivation for gaining reputational benefits). 
43 LAWRENCE B. GLICKMAN, BUYING POWER: A HISTORY OF CONSUMER ACTIVISM IN AMERICA 3 
(2009); Debbie Kasper, Contextualizing Social Practices: Insights into Social Change, in PUTTING 
SUSTAINABILITY INTO PRACTICE: APPLICATIONS AND ADVANCES IN RESEARCH ON SUSTAINABLE 
CONSUMPTION 41 (Emily Huddart Kennedy, Maurie J. Cohen & Naomi T. Krogman eds., 2015). 
44 See, e.g., Fink, supra note 37 (“Attracting and retaining the best talent increasingly requires a 
clear expression of purpose. With unemployment improving across the globe, workers, not just 
shareholders, can and will have a greater say in defining a company’s purpose, priorities, and even the 
specifics of its business. Over the past year, we have seen some of the world’s most skilled employees 
stage walkouts and participate in contentious town halls, expressing their perspective on the importance 
of corporate purpose. This phenomenon will only grow as millennials and even younger generations 
occupy increasingly senior positions in business. In a recent survey by Deloitte, millennial workers were 
asked what the primary purpose of businesses should be – 63 percent more of them said ‘improving 
society’ than said ‘generating profit.’”). 
45 Condon, supra note 41, at 43. A new nonprofit has been formed to advocate that investors with 
diversified portfolios should take this effect into account, allowing them to advocate planet-friendly 
policies. Our Story, S’HOLDER COMMONS, https://theshareholdercommons.com/about/#our-story (last 
visited Mar. 22, 2021). 
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For these reasons among others, the prevalent long-term value mantra 
may go a long way to reconciling the interests of shareholders with other 
stakeholders, including the interests of all persons in reducing the impact of 
climate change. However, this consensus is challenged from opposing directions. 
On one side are shareholder proponents who believe that ESG activism 
has gone too far, and that much of the time following what ESG believers 
propose would harm shareholder interests.46 These proponents can accept 
that good business reasons may justify addressing climate risks but deny that 
shareholders or courts can improve upon the judgment of managers. This 
may be because ESG proponents know much less about what is going on 
within a business than its directors and officers. Some shareholder 
proponents also worry that some ESG proponents may be using the 
long-term mantra to hide the true motivation of their agenda, namely, to 
co-opt the mechanisms of corporate governance to reduce climate change 
even if doing so damages the companies involved. These shareholder 
proponents go back to the gospel of Milton:47 if GHG emissions are 
imposing major external effects on the world, the proper response is with 
legislation to stop it, such as a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade program.  
A related criticism is that internal power remains focused on 
shareholders, who are the sole constituents who elect the board and have the 
power to sue over fiduciary duty violations. Director and officer 
compensation also remain focused on shareholder value, and the prospects 
of officers are naturally tied to the economic success of their business. All 
that means that we should expect directors and officers to remain tied to the 
interests of shareholders. Most other constituencies have both no power and 
also very limited knowledge about the operations of most businesses. Insofar 
as businesses spotlight the interests of others, we should expect it to be 
mostly for show.48 
 
46 Some have taken to direct counteraction against climate change shareholder action. See About, 
BURN MORE COAL, https://burnmorecoal.com/ (describing themselves as “a pro-coal electric utility 
shareholder activist group dedicated to promoting the increased use of coal as a fuel for electricity 
generation”); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Purpose in a Populist Era 1, 7 (UCLA Sch. of 
L., Law & Econ. Rsch. Paper No. 18-09, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3
237107 (explaining the populist perspective on corporate activist policies). 
47 Friedman, supra note 34, at 33. 
48 The former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, Leo E. Strine, Jr., has argued that this 
concentration of corporate power on shareholders alone is the main reason why we should expect the 
duty of directors to run to shareholders. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-
Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General 
Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 772 (2015); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle 
with the Idea That For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 147–48 (2012). 
Note, Strine’s personal opinions do not necessarily coincide with this existing legal structure. He has 
advocated various reforms to increase protection for employees in corporate governance. See generally 
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism: A Comprehensive Proposal to Help 
American Workers, Restore Fair Gainsharing Between Employees and Shareholders, and Increase 
American Competitiveness by Reorienting Our Corporate Governance System Toward Sustainable 
Long-Term Growth and Encouraging Investments in America’s Future (Harv. L. Sch. Discussion Paper 
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A different critique comes from the side of stakeholder proponents. 
These proponents agree with the Friedmanite critique that corporations as 
currently constituted are unfit to become much more aggressive in 
addressing climate change. However, these stakeholder-side critics are 
skeptical that legislative or regulatory responses will be forthcoming at the 
scale and on a timeline that is adequate to the challenge. Governments are 
captured by the very shareholder-centered companies that are causing the 
problem, and even if they had the will, they lack the resources necessary to 
enforce rules adequately were they able to enact them. Addressing climate 
change thus requires an enormous voluntary mobilization by businesses, but 
current corporations will not mobilize nearly actively enough. Corporations 
must therefore themselves be reformed, in their purposes, duties, and power 
structure, so as to represent stakeholder interests adequately, including our 
shared interest in addressing climate change.49 
Thus, three basic positions have emerged regarding the role that 
non-shareholder-focused interests, including the public interest in averting 
climate change, should play in corporate decisionmaking. All positions aim 
ultimately at improving social welfare, but they disagree as to what role 
corporations should play in doing so. The shareholder wealth maximization 
position that has dominated in the United States draws on the Smithian 
invisible hand idea:50 within functioning markets, firm profit maximization 
should maximize social welfare, with legal intervention as needed to address 
externalities that may make prices inadequate signals of true social costs.51 
The stakeholder position holds that markets and legal interventions are not 
enough, and that we need corporations to consciously pursue the general 
good, not just profits.52 The long-term shareholder position tries to reconcile 
the two extremes.53  
B. The Environmental Debate 
 Just as a triad of positions have emerged among corporate governance 
scholars regarding the proper role of companies in addressing issues of broad 
public interest like climate change, a similar variation of opinion has arisen 
 
No. 1018, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3461924 (proposing reforms to 
corporate governance because corporations act in accordance with  short-term goals and do not match 
the needs of human investors). 
49 See generally COMPANY LAW AND SUSTAINABILITY: LEGAL BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES 
(Beate Sjåfjell & Benjamin J. Richardson eds., 2015) (canvassing ideas and proposals for furthering 
sustainable companies  with the final chapter proposing reform ideas for law to stimulate environmentally 
sustainable companies). 
50 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 456 
(R. H. Campbell, A. S. Skinner & W. B. Todd eds., LibertyClassics ed. 1981). 
51 Friedman, supra note 34, at 36. 
52 Benjamin J. Richardson & Beate Sjåfjell, Capitalism, the Sustainability Crisis, and the Limitations 
of Current Business Governance, in COMPANY LAW AND SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 49, at 1. 
53 Fink, supra note 38. 
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among environmental scholars and activists. Environmental scholars and 
activists approach the issue not from the perspective of corporate 
governance but rather from what strategies and laws are most effective to 
deal with the looming climate crisis. The Paris Climate Agreement, 
concluded in 2015, sets out a clear, science-based goal for what is necessary 
to prevent dangerous climate change: holding global average temperature 
rises to well below two degrees Celsius over pre-industrial levels and 
pursuing efforts to keep temperature rises to no more than 1.5 degrees 
Celsius.54 The premier climate science body globally—the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)—advised in a 2018 
report that achieving this goal requires “rapid and far-reaching transitions” 
across all economic sectors.55 
For some environmental scholars and activists, corporations—
particularly fossil fuel corporations—are an obstacle to achieving this goal, 
rather than a part of the solution. For example, some of the key leaders of 
the “climate justice” movement, which has gained considerable momentum 
in recent years, aim to reduce emissions through targeting major corporate 
emitters of GHGs. Writing in 1999, the non-governmental organization 
(NGO) CorpWatch described the ultimate aim of the then nascent climate 
justice movement as “holding fossil fuel corporations accountable for the 
central role they play in contributing to global warming.”56 In the early 
2000s, U.S. lawsuits such as Kivalina and Comer featured plaintiffs 
(unsuccessfully) seeking to attribute legal responsibility for climate change 
harms to major oil companies.57 More recently, there has been another 
eruption of climate justice lawsuits brought against both governments and 
companies in the United States and in other countries.58   
Those in the climate justice movement with this perspective have used 
a variety of legal and campaigning strategies in their efforts to pursue 
accountability for climate-related damage, ranging from large-scale protests 
 
54 Paris Agreement, supra note 2, art. 2(1)(a). 
55 IPCC, GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C: AN IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON THE IMPACTS OF GLOBAL 
WARMING OF 1.5°C ABOVE PRE-INDUSTRIAL LEVELS AND RELATED GLOBAL GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSION PATHWAYS, IN THE CONTEXT OF STRENGTHENING THE GLOBAL RESPONSE TO THE THREAT OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, AND EFFORTS TO ERADICATE POVERTY 15 (Valérie 
Masson-Delmotte, Hans-Otto Pörtner, Jim Skea, Panmao Zhai, Debra Roberts, Priyadarshi R. Shukla, 
Anna Pirani, Roz Pidcock, Yang Chen, Elisabeth Lonnoy, Wilfran Moufouma-Okia, Sarah Connors, 
Xiao Zhou, Tom Maycock, Melinda Tignor, Clotilde Péan, J.B. Robin Matthews, Melissa I. Gomis & 
Tim Waterfield eds., 2018). 
56 What is Climate Justice?, CORPWATCH (Nov. 1, 1999), https://corpwatch.org/article/what-
climate-justice. 
57 Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 2012); Comer v. 
Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1055 (5th Cir. 2010). 
58 Geetanjali Ganguly, Joana Setzer & Veerle Heyvaert, If at First You Don’t Succeed: Suing 
Corporations for Climate Change, 38 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 841, 843 (2018); JOANA SETZER & 
REBECCA BYRNES, GLOBAL TRENDS IN CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: 2020 SNAPSHOT 27 (2020). 
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and disruptive actions to legislative advocacy and litigation.59 In addition to 
direct action against fossil fuel companies, some advocates and 
organizations, such as 350.org, have encouraged institutional investors, like 
universities, pension funds, churches, and other large charities, to divest 
their shareholdings in fossil fuel companies.60 The movement has also 
accused companies, particularly in the fossil fuel industry, of seeking to 
undermine the findings of climate science and to block progressive 
regulatory efforts to advance climate policy.61 Although some of these 
advocates simply target fossil fuels, others argue more broadly that 
unrestrained capitalism—represented by profit-driven corporate interests—
is to blame for the majority of GHG pollution.62 
A second set of environmental scholars and advocates—agreeing with 
the need to reduce corporate greenhouse gas emissions—has focused on the 
need for corporate and financial law to be reformed to give needed weight 
to the critical value of sustainability. These scholars generally identify with 
the stakeholder approach in the corporate governance literature, and focus 
on reforms to companies, as well as laws and principles governing 
investment, that could incentivize a greater focus on ESG issues.63 This may 
include reforms to corporate disclosure requirements to mandate disclosure 
 
59 See environmental movements such as Extinction Rebellion, EXTINCTION REBELLION, 
https://rebellion.global/about-us/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2020), and Fridays for Future, FRIDAYS FOR 
FUTURE, https://fridaysforfuture.org/what-we-do/who-we-are/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2020). See also the 
2015 Urgenda case, upheld on appeal to the Hague Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of the 
Netherlands, in which the court found that the Dutch state had breached its duty of care by failing to 
adopt sufficiently ambitious reduction targets. Rb.’s-Gravenhage 24 juni 2015, AB 2015, 336 m.nt. Ch. 
W. Backes (Stichting Urgenda/Staat der Nederlanden). This finding was upheld on appeal and then again 
by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands on the basis that the state had violated rights protected by the 
European Convention on Human Rights by which the Netherlands is bound. HR 20 December 2019, NJ 
2020, 41 m.nt. J. Spier (De Staat der Nederlanden/Stichting Urgenda). In the United States, the plaintiffs 
in the Juliana case asserted that the federal government violated their constitutional and public trust 
rights by burning fossil fuel. In 2016 Judge Aiken of the District of Oregon denied motions to dismiss 
the action, finding that there is a fundamental right to a climate system capable of sustaining human life. 
Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1250 (D. Or. 2016). But on January 17, 2020, a Ninth 
Circuit panel by majority reversed Judge Aiken’s decision on the basis of a lack of standing. Juliana v. 
United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1175 (9th Cir. 2020). The plaintiffs subsequently filed a petition for 
rehearing en banc, which was denied. Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Juliana, 947 F.3d 1159 (No. 18-
36082), reh’g denied, 986 F.3d 1295 (9th Cir. 2021). 
60 About 350, 350, https://350.org/about/#values (last visited Sept. 18, 2020); see also Neil 
Gunningham, Building Norms from the Grassroots Up: Divestment, Expressive Politics, and Climate 
Change, 39 LAW & POL’Y 372, 372 (2017) (discussing 350.org’s mission). 
61 NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A HANDFUL OF SCIENTISTS 
OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL WARMING 6–7 (2010); 
Gunningham, supra note 6060, at 381. 
62 Richard Heede, Tracing Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide and Methane Emissions to Fossil Fuel 
and Cement Producers, 1854–2010, 122 CLIMATIC CHANGE 229, 238 (2014); Peter C. Frumhoff, 
Richard Heede & Naomi Oreskes, The Climate Responsibilities of Industrial Carbon Producers, 132 
CLIMATIC CHANGE 157, 166–67 (2015). 
63 COMPANY LAW AND SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 49, at xvi; ELISA MORGERA, CORPORATE 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 20 (2009). 
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of environmental risks such as climate change,64 all the way up to the 
introduction of new corporate forms that allow a primary ESG-related 
objective beyond the usual focus on shareholder profit.65  
Like the convergence between shareholder and stakeholder approaches 
described above, we also see the emergence of what might be termed a 
“pragmatic middle” position on the role of companies in addressing climate 
change in environmental scholarship and practice.66 Those adopting this 
approach seek to persuade corporations, as they are currently configured, to 
do more to address climate change on the basis that this can also serve 
corporate interests where climate change poses material business risks.67 For 
example, Professor Sarah Light’s recent article, The Law of the Corporation 
as Environmental Law, argues that we should embrace corporate law 
requirements as part of the “environmental law toolkit,” using these 
nontraditional levers to encourage company action to address pressing 
environmental issues, including climate change.68 Authors such as 
Professors Michael Vandenbergh and Jonathan Gilligan in their book, 
Beyond Politics: The Private Governance Response to Climate Change, take 
an even more robust stance, arguing that private sector action on climate 
change provides a promising alternative to waiting for governments to make 
progress on the issue.69 
 
64 See, e.g., Anita Foerster, Jacqueline Peel, Hari Osofsky & Brett McDonnell, Keeping Good 
Company in the Transition to a Low Carbon Economy? An Evaluation of Climate Risk Disclosure 
Practices in Australia, 35 CO. & SEC. L.J. 154, 154 (2017) (examining current disclosure practices related 
to climate risks in Australia and suggesting reform options); Cary Di Lernia, Strange Bedfellows? 
Climate Change, Carbon Risk, and the Regulation of Corporate Disclosure, 36 CO. & SEC. L.J. 221, 221 
(2018) (discussing opportunities to improve disclosure of climate risks); Natalie Nowiski, Rising Above 
the Storm: Climate Risk Disclosure and Its Current and Future Relevance to the Energy Sector, 39 
ENERGY L.J. 1, 2 (2018) (discussing the lack of mandatory climate risk disclosure reporting in the United 
States and recommending reform options). 
65 Brett H. McDonnell, From Duty and Disclosure to Power and Participation in Social Enterprise, 
70 ALA. L. REV. 77, 78 (2018) [hereinafter McDonnell, From Duty and Disclosure]; Brett H. McDonnell, 
Benefit Corporations and Public Markets: First Experiments and Next Steps, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
717, 717 (2017); Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of Organization?, 
46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 591 (2011). 
66 The authors have articulated this view in previous work. See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky & Jacqueline 
Peel, Energy Partisanship, 65 EMORY L.J. 695, 695 (2016) (discussing strategies for advancing 
bipartisan action, economic alignment, and corporate action); Osofsky et al., Energy Re-Investment, 
supra note 4, at 606 (analyzing strategies for shifting energy investment and encouraging energy 
reinvestment); See also SARAH BARKER, COMMONWEALTH CLIMATE & L. INITIATIVE, DIRECTORS’ 
LIABILITY AND CLIMATE RISK: AUSTRALIA – COUNTRY PAPER 3 (2018) (acknowledging the material 
risks of climate change and suggesting corporate options to address the issues); Sarah Barker, Mark 
Baker-Jones, Emilie Barton & Emma Fagan, Climate Change and the Fiduciary Duties of Pension Fund 
Trustees—Lessons from the Australian Law, 6 J. SUSTAINABLE FIN. & INV. 211, 211 (2016) (suggesting 
that climate change should be considered a financial issue). 
67 Sarah E. Light, The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. 137, 146 (2019). 
68 Id. at 149. 
69 MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH & JONATHAN M. GILLIGAN, BEYOND POLITICS: THE PRIVATE 
GOVERNANCE RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 3–4 (2017). 
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Those working to advance this approach have a variety of perspectives 
on corporations and on the appropriate strategy for deploying tools from this 
“environmental toolkit.” This pragmatic middle position is sometimes held 
in conjunction with some variation on the first two positions, with these 
efforts treated as crucial complementary strategies given current partisan 
political dynamics.70 For instance, some environmental groups embracing 
this middle-ground position do so through an engagement-focused strategy 
conducted in the shadow of the threat of litigation if companies do not step 
up their game on climate change.71 A leading example is the U.K.-based 
environmental NGO, ClientEarth, whose corporate and financial law 
program includes efforts both to educate companies about climate business 
risk and also to develop shareholder lawsuits against companies which fail 
to monitor and manage these risks adequately.72 
In addition, the “pragmatic middle” position is a nuanced one because 
corporations and investors vary significantly in how they approach the 
problem of climate change and interact with the environmental community. 
Even within the fossil fuel industry, companies have positioned themselves 
differently with respect to how the energy transition needed interacts with 
their bottom line. This variation is particularly strong among oil and gas 
companies, many of which market natural gas as a transitional fuel and have 
invested significantly in renewable energy.73 Some fossil fuel companies 
have been actively involved in corporate climate change efforts, including 
sending representatives to the international climate change negotiations, 
opposing the Trump Administration’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, 
and the Biden Administration’s rejoining it.74  
 
70 Osofsky & Peel, supra note 66, at 794. 
71 Why the Law, CLIENTEARTH, https://www.clientearth.org/how-we-work/why-the-law/ (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2021). 
72 Id.  
73 Analysts have highlighted that European oil and gas companies are outpacing their U.S. rivals. 
See, e.g., Ron Bousso, Big Oil Spent 1 Percent on Green Energy in 2018, REUTERS (Nov. 11, 2018, 7:06 
PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-oil-renewables/big-oil-spent-1-percent-on-green-energy-in-
2018-idUSKCN1NH004 (explaining European companies’ expenditures on renewable efforts); Timothy 
Abington & Kelly Gilblom, Shell Leads Big Oil in the Race to Invest in Clean Energy, BLOOMBERG 
(Sept. 4, 2019, 6:11 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-04/shell-leads-big-oil-in-
the-race-to-invest-in-clean-energy-tech (“European majors closed seven times as many deals with 
renewable-electricity and storage companies as their U.S. counterparts since 2010.”). 
74 See, e.g., Thousands of Big Energy Reps at UN Climate Talks: Monitor, FRANCE24 (June 21, 
2019, 1:50 AM), https://www.france24.com/en/20190621-thousands-big-energy-reps-un-climate-talks-
monitor (“The International Emissions Trading Group (IETA), which counts among its members energy 
giants such as BP, Chevron and Shell, has sent 1,817 delegates to COPs and inter-sessional meetings 
since 2000, according to the attendees list.”); Rebecca Elliott & Bradley Olson, Oil Companies, Pushed 
to Address Climate, Disagree on How, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2019, 5:30 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/oil-companies-pushed-to-address-climate-disagree-on-how-11569144602 
(reporting that ExxonMobil, Shell, and BP will participate in U.N. climate talks); Alanna Petroff, Big 
Business Wants Trump to Stick with Paris Climate Accord, CNN (May 29, 2017, 12:29 PM), 
https://money.cnn.com/2017/05/29/news/trump-paris-climate-change-business/ (explaining that Chevron, 
ExxonMobil, and other large companies opposed President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Paris 
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The Paris Agreement negotiations and responses to President Trump and 
President Biden’s rejoining exemplify this complexity. Those negotiations 
featured an unprecedented level of engagement with business interests, 
including some fossil fuel companies and investors in them.75 Many of these 
companies and investors, including energy companies, opposed President 
Trump’s Paris Agreement withdrawal, and committed—together with other 
stakeholders—to action as part of the We Are Still In initiative.76 Additional, 
parallel private sector initiatives, such as the We Mean Business Coalition77 
and the G20 Taskforce on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD),78 
have continued to gain momentum following the Paris Agreement. Over 300 
businesses and investors from the We Mean Business Coalition wrote an 
open letter to President Biden in April 2021 praising his rejoining the Paris 
Agreement, and calling for a national “target of cutting GHG emissions by at 
least 50% below 2005 levels by 2030.”79 Both prominently feature corporate 
and investor stakeholders seeking to embed the management of climate 
change-related business risks as a matter of standard practice for companies.80  
These initiatives are complemented by efforts of shareholder advocacy 
and investor groups in the United States and other countries that advocate 
for corporate leadership on sustainability issues, often based on a program 
of shareholder activism and engagement with companies. A prominent U.S. 
example is Ceres, which describes its purpose as follows: 
Ceres is a sustainability nonprofit organization working with 
the most influential investors and companies to build 
leadership and drive solutions throughout the economy. Through 
powerful networks and advocacy, Ceres tackles the world’s 
 
Agreement); Laura Hurst, Shell CEO Hopeful Biden Will Speed Up Climate Change Fight, HOUSTON 
CHRON. (Dec. 4, 2020) (calling President Biden rejoining the Paris Agreement a “pretty good start”). 
75 Ilario D’Amato, Marc Bolland, CEO, M&S: COP21 a “Turning Point” Thanks to Business 
Engagement and Demand, CLIMATE GRP. (Dec. 6, 2015), https://www.theclimategroup.org/what-we-
do/news-and-blogs/cop21-a-turning-point-thanks-to-business-engagement-and-demand-marc-bolland-
ceo-mands. 
76 Businesses & Investors, WE ARE STILL IN, https://www.wearestillin.com/businesses-investors 
(last visited Sept. 24, 2020); Richard Luscombe, Top US Firms Including Walmart and Ford Oppose 
Trump on Climate Change, GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2017, 11:32 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/enviro
nment/2017/dec/01/trump-climate-change-paris-withdrawal-ford-walmart.  
77 What We Do, WE MEAN BUS. COAL., https://www.wemeanbusinesscoalition.org/about/ (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2020). 
78 About the Task Force, TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES, https://www.fsb-
tcfd.org/about/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2020). 
79 We Mean Business Coalition, Press Release, 310 Businesses and Investors Support U.S. Federal 
Climate Target in Open Letter to President Biden, https://www.wemeanbusinesscoalition.org/press-release
/businesses-investors-support-u-s-federal-climate-target-open-letter-president-biden/ (Apr. 13, 2021). 
80 See, e.g., TCFD, FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 1–2 (responding to calls from a range of financial 
market participants for decision-useful, climate-related information, the industry-led Task Force 
developed a framework for climate-related financial disclosures). 
 
2021] GREEN BOARDROOMS? 353 
biggest sustainability challenges, including climate change, water 
scarcity and pollution, and inequitable workplaces.81  
Those working in this middle-ground space thus include a wide array of 
actors, from environmental organizations and individual advocates, to 
corporations and investors, and non-profit organizations. 
Accordingly, we see three—at times interrelated—positions developing 
in the environmental community on the role that companies should play in 
averting dangerous climate change. All positions aim ultimately at achieving 
climate change mitigation goals, such as the Paris Agreement’s two degrees 
target, and advocate for the need for corporate behavioral change. But there 
is disagreement as to how to position corporations in that effort. The first 
position treats corporations as actors—and for some taking this position, bad 
actors—who need to be held accountable, including through litigation, for 
their major role in harming the global climate system. The other positions 
see a role for corporations as part of the solution to climate change. 
According to the second position, this will require an agenda of law and 
corporate governance reform to align corporate interests more closely with 
broader environmental stakeholder interests. Under the third position, a 
middle-ground approach using existing law is preferable, at least in the 
short-term, as a way of encouraging corporate action to address climate 
change, based on the threats it poses to businesses’ financial bottom-lines. 
None of these positions are necessarily in conflict with one another, 
other than at the extremes, such as between those who oppose entirely 
working with corporations and those who are engaging corporations in 
developing solutions to climate change. Many advocates support a 
multi-pronged approach, which might include corporate accountability 
litigation, legal reform, and collaborative work with corporations. After 
exploring current practices in Parts II through IV, we will explore what such 
an inclusive multi-pronged approach might look like in Part V. 
C. The Value of a Comparative Conceptual Approach 
Because climate change is a transnational and international problem, the 
Article takes a comparative approach. With a particular focus on Australia, 
the Article’s assessment provides recommendations so that the United States 
can benefit from what has been tried in other places. Other countries have 
also faced the challenge of how to address the role of private sector companies 
in addressing public interest issues, such as climate change. The different 
positioning of viewpoints across the corporate governance and environmental 
communities described above is replicated in the scholarship and practice of 
a number of other developed countries.82 Some countries, particularly in 
 
81 About Us, CERES, https://www.ceres.org/about-us (last visited Sept. 24, 2020).  
82 See, e.g., Beate Sjåfjell, Why Law Matters: Corporate Social Irresponsibility and the Futility of 
Voluntary Climate Change Mitigation, 8 EUR. CO. L. 56, 56 (2011) (detailing the Corporate Social 
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Europe, are developing far-reaching corporate law reforms that carve out a 
central role for ESG considerations in corporate governance.83 However, in 
others, no firm position has been reached on corporate governance and climate 
change, paralleling the U.S. approach. In this respect, Australia provides a 
useful comparison to the United States for three key reasons. 
First, like the United States, Australia has a carbon-driven economy. It 
is highly dependent on fossil-fuel exports as a principal source of income,84 
and has electricity-generation and transportation systems dominated by 
fossil fuel energy sources.85 Moreover, of the top 300 companies listed on 
the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), over half have high exposure to 
climate risk.86 These factors make regulation to address climate change a 
 
Responsibility debate in the EU); Lisa Benjamin & Stelios Andreadakis, Corporate Governance and 
Climate Change: Smoothing Temporal Dissonance to a Phased Approach, 40 BUS. L. REV. 146, 146 
(2019) (advocating for a phased approach to climate risk disclosures in the UK); Janet Dine, Corporate 
Regulation, Climate Change and Corporate Law: Challenges and Balance in an International and 
Global World, 26 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 173, 174 (2015) (comparing UK and Albanian approaches to 
directors duties and detailing effects on corporate responsibility resulting from Albanian law that allows 
lifting of corporate veils); Benjamin J. Richardson, Putting Ethics into Environmental Law: Fiduciary 
Duties for Ethical Investment, 46 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 243, 244–45 (2008) (discussing potential 
environmental regulation approaches for Canada, the U.S., and Europe stemming from socially 
responsible investment). 
83 See supra note 22; Communication from The Commission to the European Parliament, the 
European Council, the Council, the European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Action Plan: Financing Sustainable Growth, at 1, COM 
(2018) 97 final (Aug. 3, 2018) (detailing the European Commission’s action plan to comply with the 
goals set by the Paris Agreement). For a broader overview of these reforms, see Sustainable Finance, 
EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/sustainable-finan
ce_en (last visited Mar. 25, 2021). An example of this type of reform is the French Energy Transition 
Law, introduced in 2015, which requires listed companies to report on financial risks linked to the effects 
of climate change and the measures that the company takes to reduce such effects by implementing a 
low-carbon strategy in all components of its business. AMY MASON, WILL MARTINDALE, ALYSSA HEATH 
& SAGARIKA CHATTERJEE, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INV., FRENCH ENERGY TRANSITION LAW: 
GLOBAL INVESTOR BRIEFING 7 (2016) [hereinafter FRENCH ENERGY TRANSITION LAW]. 
84 Australia’s mining sector accounted for 8.7% of the country’s GDP in 2019 and 28% of its GDP 
growth in 2019. Resource and energy commodity exports are forecasted to earn $299 billion in 2019–20. 
OFF. OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, RESOURCES AND ENERGY QUARTERLY 4, 6 (2020). The Australia 
Institute analysis categorizes Australia as the world’s third largest fossil fuel exporter. TOM SWANN, THE 
AUSTL. INST., HIGH CARBON FROM A LAND DOWN UNDER: QUANTIFYING CO2 FROM AUSTRALIA’S 
FOSSIL FUEL MINING AND EXPORTS 2 (2019). 
85 In 2017–18, “fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas) accounted for 94 per cent of Australia’s primary 
energy mix.” DEP’T OF THE ENV’T & ENERGY, AUSTRALIAN ENERGY UPDATE 2019, at 8 (2019). Fossil 
fuels contributed to 81% of total electricity generation in 2018, with coal accounting for 60% of total 
generation and gas-fired generation representing 19% of total generation. Id. at 28. Further, transport 
constituted the largest consumer of energy, with road and air transport accounting for 71% and 20% of 
energy consumption, respectively. Id. at 13. 
86 MKT. FORCES, OUT OF LINE, OUT OF TIME 2 (2019). For energy and electricity-generation 
companies, climate risk is primarily transitional risk associated with the potential for increasing 
regulation of carbon emissions and the risk of stranded assets. However, Australian companies also have 
significant exposure to physical climate risk, given the country’s hot, dry climate and particular 
vulnerability to climate change-fuelled extreme weather events like heatwaves, wildfires and flooding. 
See Narelle Hooper, 3 Major Areas of Concern for Climate Risk in Australia, AUSTL. INST. CO. DIR. 
(May 1, 2019), https://aicd.companydirectors.com.au/membership/company-director-magazine/2019-
back-editions/may/climate-risk (detailing the risks that climate change poses for companies). 
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central issue of economic importance and corporate concern in Australia, as 
in the United States. 
Second, Australia offers a socio-political and cultural context that is perhaps 
the most closely aligned with the United States of any country worldwide. This 
is particularly so when it comes to the issue of climate change, which has 
produced strong partisan divides and national legislative paralysis similar to that 
seen in the United States.87 Australia briefly experimented with a carbon tax in 
the early 2010s,88 which was effective in lowering energy-related GHG 
emissions,89 but this was repealed by an incoming conservative government.90 
In the aftermath, national climate regulatory proposals have stalled,91 leading 
environmental activists to focus on other avenues for achieving progress, 
including changes in corporate behavior. 
Finally, Australia shares a similar corporate and securities law 
framework to the United States, based in the Anglo-American corporate law 
tradition.92 Although relevant laws on disclosure, shareholder proposals, and 
directors’ duties are by no means identical,93 the general structure of laws 
and the dominance of the shareholder wealth-maximization view are shared 
by both the United States and Australia.94 This means that efforts to use 
 
87 Hari M. Osofsky & Jacqueline Peel, The Grass is Not Always Greener: Congressional 
Dysfunction, Executive Action, and Climate Change in Comparative Perspective, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
139, 140 (2016). 
88 Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.), as repealed by Clean Energy Legislation (Carbon Tax 
Repeal) Act 2014 (Cth) (Austl.). 
89 For analysis on the efficacy of the carbon tax, see Marianna O’Gorman & Frank Jotzo, Impact of 
the Carbon Price on Australia’s Electricity Demand, Supply and Emissions 1 (Austl. Nat’l Univ., 
Working Paper 1411, 2014). For a broader review of Australia’s climate change law over time, see Ilona 
Millar & Sophie Whitehead, Climate Change Law in Australia—A History and the Current State of Play, 
92 AUSTL. L.J. 756, 756 (2018). 
90 Clean Energy Legislation (Carbon Tax Repeal) Act 2014 (Cth) (Austl.). 
91 AUSTL. PANEL OF EXPERTS ON ENV’T L., CLIMATE LAW: TECHNICAL PAPER 5, 11 (2017). There 
is also more recent commentary on a possible “climate truce” following the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Matthew Warren, Australian Politics Quietly Reaches a Truce in the Climate Wars, AUSTL. FIN. REV. 
(July 6, 2020, 2:52 PM), https://www.afr.com/policy/energy-and-climate/australian-politics-quietly-
reaches-a-truce-in-the-climate-wars-20200706-p559b4. 
92 JOHN FARRAR, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE THEORIES, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 5 (3d. ed. 2008). 
93 A key distinction is that the concept of “fiduciary duties” in Australia differs from that in the 
United States, though there are duties owed by directors who are fiduciaries. However, not all such duties 
are fiduciary duties. In the case of the duty of care, it is a common law duty and an equitable duty: See 
ROBERT AUSTIN & IAN RAMSAY, FORD, AUSTIN & RAMSAY’S PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATIONS LAW 
paras. 8.010.3, 8.320 (2019) (explaining the position in Australia).  A similar position applies in other 
common law countries, which generally treat loyalty as the only “fiduciary duty.” See Christopher M. 
Bruner, Is the Corporate Director’s Duty of Care a “Fiduciary” Duty? Does It Matter?, 48 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1027, 1027–29 (2013) (noting that in the UK loyalty is the only fiduciary duty). In this 
Article, we have used the term “fiduciary duties” simply for convenience in discussing relevant duties 
under Australian law.  
94 Malcolm Anderson, Meredith Jones, Shelley Marshall, Richard Mitchell & Ian Ramsay, 
Shareholder Primacy and Directors’ Duties: An Australian Perspective, 8 J. CORP. L. STUD. 161, 162 
(2008); Richard Mitchell, Anthony O’Donnell, Ian Ramsay & Michelle Welsh, Shareholder Protection 
in Australia: Institutional Configurations and Regulatory Evolution, 38 MELBOURNE U.L. REV. 68, 94–
95 n.134 (2014).  
 
356 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:2 
corporate law tools to shape corporate behavior on climate change in 
Australia, as well stakeholders’ perception of the effectiveness of such efforts, 
offer lessons for evolving practice in the United States, and vice versa. 
As we describe further in Parts II and III below, legal requirements 
regarding disclosure and shareholder proposals are generally more favorable 
to addressing climate change issues in the United States than in Australia, 
although greater access for investors to companies through informal 
engagement avenues may obviate the need for the more confrontational 
approach seen in the United States. Large institutional investors, such as 
sovereign wealth funds and pension funds (including Australia’s substantial 
“superannuation” funds), have made significant investments in the top-200 
Australian listed companies (ASX200),95 with their concentrated 
shareholding giving them significant sway with companies.96 In the context 
of fiduciary duties, the legal positions of the United States and Australia are 
reversed, with broader interpretations of relevant duties in Australia 
potentially easing the pathway for potential litigation there.97 In addition, 
while the volume of shareholder proposals in Australia is dwarfed by that in 
the United States, interesting approaches are emerging around non-binding 
advisory resolutions in more well-established investor-corporate engagement 
activities that particularly focus on questions such as corporate lobbying and 
membership of industry organizations with anti-climate regulatory 
positions.98 As these practices continue to evolve, they could offer examples 
of approaches that might also be pursued in U.S. shareholder activism. 
This multi-pronged, comparative approach is not a panacea. No one has 
yet found a politically realistic way to address climate change at the pace 
that is needed to prevent major impacts, and corporate and financial law 
cannot address this problem without other significant environmental and 
energy law initiatives. Nonetheless, the Parts that follow provide an in-depth 
assessment, grounded in original interview-based research, of current views 
on the impact of these efforts to date, which provides a basis for assessing 
how to make future strategies more effective. 
II. DISCLOSURE 
The following three Parts provide our review of current developments 
in disclosure, shareholder proposals and engagement, and fiduciary duty 
based on our interview findings in a comparative U.S.-Australian context. 
 
95 JUSTIN ELLIS, UNDERSTANDING OWNERSHIP TRENDS IN AUSTRALIA: 2018 KEY INSIGHTS 6 (2018). 
96 PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMM. ON CORPS. & FIN. SERVS., CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY: 
MANAGING RISK AND CREATING VALUE 65 (2006). 
97 Barker, supra note 66, at 58–59. 
98 The Australasian Centre for Corporate Responsibility (ACCR) maintains details of resolutions. 
AUSTRALASIAN CTR. FOR CORP. RESP., https://www.accr.org.au/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2021); Australian 
ESG Shareholder Resolutions, AUSTRALASIAN CTR. FOR CORP. RESP., https://accr.org.au/shareholder-
action/resolution-voting-history/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2020). 
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Each Part examines current developments and then discusses existing 
practices, drawing on qualitative interviews conducted with several dozen 
stakeholders in the United States and Australia.99 Interviewees included 
mostly persons who work for corporations and investors, although they also 
included regulators, advocacy groups, and service providers. In the United 
States, interview participants encompassed the following groups: 
• Listed companies (five interviews), drawn from the industry 
sectors of utilities, financial, food, retail, and materials. 
Interviews were undertaken with a corporate director, an 
in-house counsel with a securities law focus, and 
sustainability staff. 
• Asset owners (three interviews), including a public employee 
pension fund, a union pension fund, and a charitable foundation.  
• Asset managers (four interviews), including two investment 
funds with a focus on socially responsible investing and two 
with a focus on index funds. 
• Investor and company service providers (two interviews).  
• Investor associations (one interview). 
In Australia, interviews covered similar groups, including: 
• Corporate and financial sector regulators (two interviews). 
• Civil society advocacy groups engaging with corporate law 
tools to influence company decisionmaking on energy 
transition (two interviews).  
• Investor groups or associations (two interviews).  
• Investor service providers providing ESG analysis, proxy voting, 
engagement and representation services (two interviews). 
• Listed ASX50 companies (seven interviews), drawn from the 
industry sectors of energy, utilities and materials. Interviews 
were undertaken with various company officers including 
company secretaries, investment relations, and sustainability 
staff.  
• Asset owners, with predominantly industry superfunds 
(seven interviews). Interviews were conducted with in-house 
ESG and investment analysts. 
 
99 Interviews were conducted in the United States with a total of fourteen persons from August to 
November of 2018. Interviews were conducted in Australia with a total of twenty-four persons from 
February to August of 2018. All interviewees’ identities will be kept anonymous, except for the relevant 
aspects of identity, listed above. Interviewees are identified numerically by country (e.g., US1, AUS1). 
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• Asset managers (two interviews), with fund managers 
associated with the asset owners interviewed for the research. 
Interviews were conducted with in-house ESG and 
investment analysts.100 
This Part focuses on disclosure, which is one of the main securities law 
tools being used to promote a faster energy transition. In a previous Article, 
we discussed several pathways by which disclosure could do so.101 
Disclosure could provoke disinvestment from companies with higher GHG 
emissions profiles to those with lower ones by revealing risks of the former 
and opportunities of the latter. It could affect involvement in companies by 
consumers and employees. Disclosure could also promote shifting of 
resources within companies by affecting the focus of and information 
available to corporate decisionmakers.102 
U.S. companies whose shares trade publicly must engage in a variety of 
required periodic disclosure, such as annual reports on Form 10-K and 
quarterly reports on Form 10-Q.103 There are no specific requirements 
concerning climate change-related disclosure, but a variety of required 
disclosures may be implicated where climate change threatens to have a 
material impact on the financial performance of a company. Companies may 
also choose to disclose beyond what the securities laws require in other 
documents, and now many do so for various sustainability matters. This first 
Section reviews developments in mandatory and voluntary disclosure 
surrounding climate change and presents results from our interviews 
concerning the effects of these developments.104  
 
100 In this Article we include insights from the Australian interviews, mainly as a comparison to the 
U.S. findings. For a fuller analysis of the results of the Australian interviews, see generally Jacqueline 
Peel, Anita Foerster, Brett McDonnell & Hari M. Osofsky, Governing the Energy Transition: The Role 
of Corporate Law Tools, 36(5) ENV’T & PLAN. L.J. 459 (2019) and the authors report on this research 
project: Jacqueline Peel, Hari Osofsky, Brett McDonnell, Anita Foerster & Rebekkah Markey-Towler, 
Corporate Energy Transition: Legal Tools for Shifting Companies Towards Clean Energy Practices 
(2020), available at https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/3500460/Corporate-Energy-
Transition-Report.pdf (accessed April 13, 2021). 
101 See generally Osofsky et al., Energy Re-Investment, supra note 4. 
102 Id. at 649–52. 
103 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq); 17 C.F.R. § 229.601 (2020). 
104 In addition to the effects discussed below, one way that climate activists can use disclosure is 
through enforcement actions. Most prominently, various state attorneys general have investigated the 
reporting practices of ExxonMobil, and, in 2016, a shareholder class action was brought against that 
company. Justin Gillis & Clifford Krauss, Exxon Mobil Investigated for Possible Climate Change Lies 
by New York Attorney General, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/06/scien
ce/exxon-mobil-under-investigation-in-new-york-over-climate-statements.html; Ivan Penn, California 
to Investigate Whether Exxon Mobil Lied About Climate-Change Risks, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2016, 3:00 
AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-exxon-global-warming-20160120-story.html; SETZER & 
BYRNES, supra note 58, at 21. 
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A. Legal and Institutional Developments 
In 2010, the SEC issued guidance on applying various reporting 
requirements to risks connected to climate change.105 It included examples 
covering both risks that the effects of climate change may have on company 
assets and operations (so-called physical risks), and legal, market, and 
reputational risks associated with how a company responds, or fails to 
respond, to emerging rules and best practices that attempt to reduce GHG 
emissions (so-called non-physical or transition risks).106  
Early analysis of mandated reports following the 2010 SEC guidance 
suggested that disclosure concerning climate change did increase, but the 
disclosure by many companies remained brief and lacking in substance.107 
A more recent analysis found that in 2018, about 40% of S&P 500 
companies addressed sustainability in their annual reports or 10-Ks.108 
Thirty-eight percent discussed sustainability issues in their annual proxy 
statements, typically in a summary at the beginning of the filing.109 
Companies may also choose to report matters beyond what the securities 
laws require. The demand from both shareholders and other stakeholders for 
information related to climate change and other sorts of sustainability 
concerns, combined with the lack of detailed rules from the SEC, has led to 
a growth of efforts to create voluntary disclosure standards. There are a 
variety of organizations competing to provide frameworks for disclosure 
concerning climate change. The Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) focuses 
specifically on greenhouse gas emissions,110 and the TCFD also focuses on 
climate change issues.111 In contrast, the Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI),112 Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB),113 and 
International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC)114 cover a wide range of 
sustainability topics. Some frameworks, like the TCFD, follow a 
standards-based approach while others, like the CDP and SASB, include 
more specific rules. In addition to organizations like these, which publish 
publicly available frameworks that companies may use in their reporting, 
other organizations gather information privately and use that information to 
issue ratings concerning performance along a variety of metrics, including 
metrics related to the environment and climate change. Leading examples 
 
105 Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290 
(Feb. 8, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211, 231, 241). 
106 Id. 
107 COBURN & COOK, supra note 5, at 11–12. 
108 KWON, STATE OF SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 5, at 33. 
109 Id. 
110 CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, https://www.cdp.net/en (last visited Mar. 27, 2021). 
111 TCFD, FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at i. 
112 GLOB. REPORTING INITIATIVE, G4 SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING GUIDELINES (2013), https://c
ommdev.org/pdf/publications/Global-Reporting-Initiative-G4-Sustainability-Reporting-Guidelines.pdf. 
113 SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., SASB CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 1 (2017). 
114 INT’L INTEGRATED REPORTING COUNCIL, THE INTERNATIONAL <IR> FRAMEWORK 2 (2013). 
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include MSCI115 and Sustainalytics.116 In the United States, none of these 
competing approaches have yet achieved clear market dominance.117 
Voluntary reporting of regular sustainability reports is much more 
widespread and extensive. A study of reporting in 2018 found that 92% of 
S&P 500 countries offered sustainability information on their websites.118 
About 78% of these companies issued sustainability reports.119 Ninety-five 
percent offered environmental performance metrics, and 67% set quantified 
environmental goals.120 Only a minority of the reports, 38%, obtained any 
external assurance concerning their reports.121 
The literature on disclosure under securities law in general, and 
specifically on disclosure related to environmental issues, has identified 
various benefits and costs of such disclosure. Disclosure helps both investors 
and other stakeholders, such as customers and employees, decide whether or 
not to associate with the disclosing company.122 Disclosure can reduce 
informational asymmetries between the company and various stakeholders, 
reducing moral hazard and adverse selection issues.123 The process of 
gathering and evaluating information to be disclosed can also change and 
improve internal decisionmaking.124 However, there are direct monetary 
costs involved in gathering information. The process of gathering 
information will also divert the time and attention of directors, officers, and 
employees. Another concern is information overload.125  
Given the availability of voluntary disclosure, are there market 
imperfections that justify making some disclosure required?126 Mandatory 
rules can standardize disclosure, making comparison across firms easier for 
investors and others.127 Required sustainability disclosure could also 
encourage the reduction of externalities in company behavior (e.g., emission 
 
115 Our Purpose, MSCI, https://www.msci.com/our-purpose (last visited Mar. 27, 2021). 
116 About Us, SUSTAINALYTICS, https://www.sustainalytics.com/about-us/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2021). 
117 KWON, STATE OF SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 5, at 16–24; PUBLIC COMPANIES REPORT, supra 
note 5, at 41. 
118 KWON, STATE OF SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 5, at 27. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 29. 
121 Id. 
122 See supra note 101–02 and accompanying text. 
123 Lipton, supra note 21, at 508–09; Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange 
Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1209–11 (1999); Christensen 
et al., supra note 29, at 15. 
124 Lipton, supra note 21, at 509; Hillary A. Sale, Disclosure’s Purpose, 107 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1047 (2019). 
125 Virginia Harper Ho, Disclosure Overload? Lessons for Risk Disclosure & ESG Reporting 
Reform from the Regulation S-K Concept Release, 65 VILL. L. REV. 67, 70 (2020). 
126 Christensen et al., supra note 29, at 18; Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 
Information Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 67 J. FIN. 195, 195 (2012); Christian Leuz & Peter 
Wysocki, Economic Consequences of Financial Reporting and Disclosure Regulation: A Review and 
Suggestions for Future Research, 54 J. ACCT. RES. 525 (2016).  
127 Christensen et al., supra note 29, at 18; PUBLIC COMPANIES REPORT, supra note 5, at 5. 
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of GHGs).128 However, beyond the obvious direct costs of gathering and 
disclosing information, if the disclosure rules are not well designed, they 
may focus companies on low-value matters.129 Voluntary approaches may 
also provide more flexibility for companies to disclose only information that 
is relevant to their businesses, thereby reducing costs.130 The limited 
evidence on mandatory sustainability disclosure suggests that reporting 
regulation may increase costs, but it also may reduce harmful activities 
targeted by the regulation.131 
Some jurisdictions have recently adopted rules requiring disclosure of 
various sustainability matters, including climate change.132 In 2016, France 
implemented a significant law requiring disclosure specifically focused on 
climate change.133 The law requires listed companies to disclose financial 
risks related to climate change, the measures adopted to reduce them, and 
the consequences of climate change for their activities.134 The European 
Union is in the process of enacting rules concerning disclosure of 
sustainability risks.135  
As part of a broad release seeking public comment on a wide range of 
disclosure issues, the SEC, in 2016, sought guidance on the need for more 
detailed rules on ESG issues, including climate change.136 So far, the SEC 
has not proposed any new rules.137 The Concept Release received a large 
number of comments.138 Of those who commented, investors mostly 
supported more extensive and rule-like disclosure rules, while companies 
opposed such changes.139 In February of 2021, the acting chair of the SEC 
issued a public statement directing the Division of Corporate Finance “to 
enhance its focus on climate-related disclosure in public company 
filings.”140 A month later she issued a request for public comments on such 
 
128 Christensen et al., supra note 29, at 19. 
129 Id. at 20. 
130 PUBLIC COMPANIES REPORT, supra note 5, at 38. 
131 Id. at 38–39. 
132 FRENCH ENERGY TRANSITION LAW, supra note 83, at 4. 
133 Id. at 6. 
134 Id. at 7. 
135 Paul Davies & Michael D. Green, EU Issues New Sustainable Investment Disclosure Rules, 
LEXOLOGY (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=61d5698f-bf73-451c-9c49-
bdc6b342442b. 
136 Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S–K, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,916 (Apr. 22, 
2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 229, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249). 
137 See Jennifer Burns, Christine Robinson & Kristen Sullivan, The Atmosphere for Climate-Change 
Disclosure, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 5, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2020/04/05/the-atmosphere-for-climate-change-disclosure/ (explaining the SEC’s 2010 guidance 
remains relevant). 
138 Ho, supra note 125, at 91. 
139 Id. at 92. 
140 Allison Herren Lee, Statement on the Review of Climate-Related Disclosure, SEC (Feb. 24, 
2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/lee-statement-review-climate-related-disclosure. 
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disclosure.141 The SEC’s Division of Enforcement has created a Climate and 
ESG Task Force, which  will focus on gaps in issuer disclosure.142 
Climate-related disclosure is thus clearly high on the agenda of the SEC 
under the Biden administration. 
As we have seen, one way that disclosure may promote energy transition 
is by causing shareholders and other stakeholders to reassess whom they 
choose to patronize.143 Reflecting the shareholder primacy approach 
discussed in Part I,144 the dominant though disputable145 view is that federal 
securities law mandates disclosure solely for the benefit of investors and that 
the disclosure should focus on the financial risks associated with an 
investment. Disclosure around sustainability issues such as climate change 
is then justified to the extent that such matters may have a material effect on 
financial returns.146 That is clearly the position the SEC took in its 2010 
guidance on climate change-related disclosure.147  
Whether or not current securities law is understood as legally focused 
only on investors, it is not just investors who use that disclosure—investors, 
employees, and other stakeholders also use it. Information that may not be 
material to financial results may be material to the interests of other stakeholders. 
Regulation that focuses only on financial risks and returns will not force 
companies to reveal all of the information that matters to other stakeholders.148 
The literature reveals much concern about the quality of current 
disclosure. The lack of mandatory rules allows companies to selectively pick 
and choose what they want to disclose, emphasizing positive developments 
and making it hard to compare developments across companies.149 The 
IRRC Institute’s survey of S&P 500 company reporting found that most 
companies pick and choose among various frameworks, customizing a 
unique style.150 Only a minority obtain any external assurance.151 
Investors are also unhappy with current disclosure. A recent survey of 
institutional investors found that many believe that current “disclosures are 
imprecise and not sufficiently informative.”152 They also believe that there 
 
141 Allison Herren Lee, Public Input Welcomed on Climate Change Disclosure, SEC (Mar. 15, 
2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/lee-climate-change-disclosures. 
142 Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces Enforcement Task Force Focused on Climate and ESG 
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should be more standardization.153 Another recent survey similarly reported 
inconsistencies in quantitative disclosures between companies, which limits 
comparability (for example, differing approaches to reporting CO2 
emissions), as well as gaps in narrative disclosures, which undermines 
investors’ ability to understand companies’ strategies for managing risks and 
opportunities.154 An analysis of public comment letters to the SEC’s 2016 
questions on the current state of disclosure showed that most responding 
investors said that current disclosure leads to too little disclosure and too 
much boilerplate.155 The lack of standardization is thus a serious concern. 
This is a widely-recognized justification for mandatory disclosure regulation 
in the general literature on securities law.156 But private coordination may 
be able to set effective standards without the need for governmental 
regulation, and private standard-setting may be more likely to agree upon 
efficient standards than government agencies.157 Perhaps, for instance, the 
recent announcement by BlackRock’s CEO158 that they are pushing their 
portfolio companies to use SASB and TCFD will help focus disclosure on 
those two standards. More recently, many of the leading organizations 
promoting voluntary climate-related and ESG disclosure have made efforts 
to increase coordination among private standards. In September of 2020, 
five organizations—CDP, SASB, GRI, the Climate Disclosure Standards 
Board, and Integrated Reporting—released a paper detailing how they intend 
to work together to help create a more standardized reporting system.159 
B. U.S. Interview Findings 
Our U.S. interview participants were employed by a variety of types of 
entities, including operating companies, investors, asset managers, law 
firms, and advocacy organizations.160 We asked them several open-ended 
questions concerning disclosure related to climate change. These included 
whether there is agreement on the importance of climate change disclosure 
and what it should look like; how disclosure affects investment and 
engagement decisions by investors and asset managers; how disclosure 
practices could be improved; and whether and how disclosure affects risk 
management and operating decisions by the disclosing companies. We describe 
here some of the patterns that emerged in the participants’ answers that help 
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elaborate what is happening in practice with disclosure, and the extent to 
which it is (or is not) shaping corporate behavior regarding climate change. 
Participants confirmed that there has been a major increase in climate 
change disclosure in recent years. However, their overall view was that the 
quality of this disclosure is mixed. While larger companies and those in 
industries more exposed to climate change risks are more likely to make 
detailed and helpful disclosures, many companies cherry-pick positive 
information or make vague or boilerplate statements.  
One participant, who advises companies on disclosure and engagement, 
commented, “It’s gone from nothing to a policy-and-platitudes type of 
disclosure.”161 Another, who works as a securities lawyer at a law firm, 
responded that “most companies do nothing,”162 but noted that, for those 
who do report, disclosure can vary from “lofty goals and statements as 
opposed to some others that really give graphs, give data, give hard 
information.”163 An employee of an investment firm with a focus on 
responsible investment noted that disclosure is “a relatively new area” for 
small and mid-cap companies, with “a huge amount of work to be done” to 
effect improvements.164 This participant thought that overall “we’re on the 
right path,”165 whereas others voiced a need for more standardization to 
improve quality: “[T]he next step is to put more data around it, and more 
meat on the bones so that the people who consume this information can see 
exactly what you’re talking about, what the risks are.”166 
A factor underlying the current variability in disclosure practice appears 
to be proliferating available models, with participants noting the presence of 
competing standards. One participant, who is an employee at an asset 
management company, commented on the lack of consensus, noting, “It’s 
actually worse than that. Everybody wants to set the standard. The 
proliferation of sustainability codes is getting to be absurd.”167 This position 
was reflected in the interview results as a whole, with some participants 
seeing no particular standard currently emerging as the leading one. Others 
did point to one or two standards as the current or emerging leader, but 
identified different standards in this regard, with CDP, TCFD, GRI, and 
SASB all being mentioned. As one consultant participant described it: 
There’s a bunch of people currently looking at MSCI, others 
looking at TCFD, others thinking about SRI, SASB. So, there’s 
all these different organizations out there. Different organizations 
that are in a lot of ways competing with each other for the 
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attention of the various stakeholders, and it contributes to a lot 
of confusion, but at the same time is also demonstrating just 
how much energy and need there is in this space.168 
A frequent point made by participants was that the lack of common 
standards makes it harder to compare practice across companies, or even for 
the same company over time. A securities lawyer commented:  
Right now there’s no standards, so the ability to do comparability 
just doesn’t exist, and when you look at data you just don’t 
know if this is apples to apples to anything. Because there’s no 
standards in the way we measured it this year, the same way 
we measured it last year, the way we’ll measure it next year.169 
On the company side, as well as for investors, the proliferation of 
standards is a problem, as companies face pressures to respond to varying 
requests for information, and must decide which, if any, standards to follow. 
Although companies generally opposed new SEC disclosure rules for 
sustainability matters in comments to the 2016 release,170 the growth of 
standards since then may give more reason for companies to accept, or at 
least less strongly oppose, new rulemaking that would provide uniformity.171 
As one of our company-side interviewees remarked, “I think clarity is a 
helpful thing, and so I think if the SEC were to come out with a required 
standard of disclosure it would be helpful, because it would simplify our 
work, and it would simplify the work for the investor.”172 
Despite the variability and lack of comparability at present, practices in 
climate change disclosure are clearly evolving. In the last few years, it has 
gone from imprecise qualitative statements, to more precise and detailed 
quantitative metrics, to setting specific targets to be attained. A participant 
on the investor side commented particularly on the emergence of disclosure 
using targets. According to this participant, “the best companies know why 
or why they cannot hit a target,” with sometimes the most useful disclosures 
being about “why you can’t hit a target.”173 
As noted above, many argue that customers, employees, and other 
stakeholders are major intended audiences of sustainability disclosure, not 
just investors.174 Several of our interviewees made the same point, noting 
diverse disclosure drivers such as “brand enhancement,”175 particularly with 
millennial customers who may have a deep concern about climate issues.176 
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Indeed, where disclosure has a real effect on company behavior, it may be 
more because of concern about the company’s reputation with other 
stakeholders than with shareholders. One participant, a securities lawyer, 
related an anecdote about a board receiving a shareholder proposal, which 
the board was initially reluctant to engage with, “but when they changed the 
narrative a little bit and thought about the value of the responsibility report 
and some more reporting on environmental as a way to attract millennials 
who are a target of their employment efforts, then they became more 
receptive to it.”177 
In the past, climate-related disclosures have often been made in separate 
voluntary sustainability reports rather than in mandated securities disclosures. 
Several interviewees noted, however, a significant benefit of including such 
disclosure within financial disclosure documents mandated under securities 
law: information gathered for securities law disclosure gets more attention 
within a corporation due to liability concerns.178 As one pension fund 
employee participant remarked, “I think the implications will force 
management and the board to engage in a more meaningful way.”179 Indeed, 
the threat of liability has induced public companies to build in extensive 
systems for collecting and verifying such information. There is both an 
internal audit system and external auditors. Top executive officers review 
the process and resulting information, and the board is involved below.180  
By contrast, a weakness of the voluntary disclosure of sustainability 
information is that the collection and processing of such information may be 
done within a sustainability office that is isolated from other operating 
divisions. As a consequence, these reports, “even though they get some level 
of review, they clearly don’t get the level of review and scrutiny as if you’re 
actually going to take the extra step of putting it in your proxy.”181 According 
to a sustainability officer participant, “the best thing that could happen with 
disclosure is integrated reporting, meaning not having a separate 
sustainability report with the GRI index and an annual report.”182 This would 
help make such reporting standardized, central to corporate operations, and 
a requirement rather than a voluntary option.183 However, this was not a 
universal view. A lawyer within an operating company noted one of the 
counter-arguments in favor of separate sustainability reports as being the 
likelihood of more information being disclosed. This participant commented: 
While I understand the movement to include things in all 
filings so it’s together, I think the focus of CR reports, if done 
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well, probably give you more and better information than if 
you were to try and fold it into a filed document where it’s one 
of a number of issues. This topic in particular is an area where 
people want more details. Probably more details than would 
be considered material.184 
The ultimate question about the new climate change disclosure practice 
is whether it is causing companies to respond to climate change risks and 
opportunities more quickly. In a context where climate change disclosure 
only started in earnest recently and is very rapidly evolving, the interview 
evidence shows that many factors are working to both encourage and block 
company change. Reflecting this, interviewees expressed different opinions 
about the effect of disclosure on company behavior. 
No interviewee on the company side pointed to any clear way in which 
disclosure was causing their company to behave differently in a substantive 
way. The exception was the corporate sustainability officer, noted above, 
who spoke of several instances where concern about customer reaction 
caused the company to pay attention to a few matters.185 Most interviewees 
on the company side seemed to think their companies were already heavily 
engaged with climate change questions and the pressure for disclosure was 
simply pushing them to better communicate what they were already doing. 
Another sustainability officer more forcefully denied that shareholder 
proposals encouraging more disclosure would change corporate behavior, 
characterizing this as “a mistaken theory of change.”186 
Some on the investor side had more hope that disclosure would 
eventually change behavior, particularly as disclosure evolves to include 
more detailed metrics and targets. A pension fund employee opined: “If 
SASB were ever to realize its true objective of getting into the financial 
statement, it may not provide as good information to investors, but it will be 
more likely to change company behavior because it’s the kind of disclosure 
that ultimately has to go to the boardroom.”187 The same person continued: 
“There is no question that there is an uptake in engagement and more 
companies understand the need to engage and even now at the board level. I 
think there is an emphasis in trying to appear responsive to investors.” A 
former pension fund employee expressed more impatience with relying on 
existing disclosure rules, stating, “the regulatory system has a much larger 
role to play, and our legal system, and frankly our governmental 
agencies.”188 Overall, then, it appears based on the interviewees’ insights 
that increasing disclosure has not yet changed company behavior 
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significantly in the United States, but has potential to do so if pursued in a 
more standardized and rigorous way. 
C. Australian Interview Findings 
In Australia, our interview participants came from a range of different 
entities, including ASX50 listed companies, investor groups, asset 
managers, regulators, superannuation funds, and civil society advocacy 
organizations.189 As with our U.S. participants, we asked them a similar set 
of open-ended questions concerning Australian business practices on 
disclosure related to climate change. We first describe here the relevant 
corporate legal requirements pertaining to disclosure by Australian 
companies, before comparing the patterns that emerged in the participants’ 
answers to those of our U.S. participants. 
As in the United States, federal corporations law in Australia does not 
mandate specific climate-related disclosures, nor any form of sustainability 
reporting. Instead, companies listed on the ASX must provide financial 
statements which present a “true and fair view” of the company’s financial 
position and performance, as well as disclose risks that are financially 
material for their businesses in a Director’s Report.190 Although Australian 
company and securities regulators have not introduced an equivalent to the 
SEC’s 2010 guidance,191 various recent regulatory guides and statements 
indicate a growing expectation of disclosure of climate (and other ESG) risks 
where those risks are judged to be financially material for ASX-listed 
companies.192 Influential opinions issued by leading corporate lawyers have 
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also highlighted the liability exposure of companies that fail to disclose 
financially material climate business risks.193 This legal theory was tested in 
the case of Abrahams v. Commonwealth Bank of Australia, involving a 
shareholder claim against one of the country’s largest banks, alleging a failure 
to disclose climate risks in its 2016 Annual Report.194 The proceedings were 
withdrawn, but only following the bank’s commitment to improve disclosure 
practices, with noticeable improvements in subsequent annual reports.195 
A key difference between Australian and U.S. climate risk disclosure 
practice is developing consensus in Australia around the framework that 
should guide any such climate-related financial disclosures, with the TCFD 
emerging as the supported standard in this regard and many leading 
companies formally adopting this approach.196 The TCFD has been 
favorably referenced as a climate risk disclosure framework by the 
Australian corporate regulator, ASIC.197 It also appears that institutional 
investors in Australia have played a key role in raising the profile of the 
TCFD by using this framework in their engagement strategies with 
companies. For example, the Australian Council of Superannuation 
Investors (ACSI), whose members manage AUD $2.2 trillion in assets, has 
described the TCFD recommendations as the emerging “gold standard” for 
climate risk reporting by Australian listed companies.198 The TCFD’s 2019 
status report indicates that, globally, 785 companies and other organizations 
have committed to support the TCFD.199 This growing global acceptance, 
alongside default adoption of the TCFD framework in countries such as 
Australia, may be influential for U.S. practice as different disclosure 
standards compete there for prominence. 
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Our results from interviews with Australian participants showed a 
similar pattern to the United States of highly variable disclosure practice that 
is in a considerable state of flux. Overall, the investors interviewed described 
the disclosure practices of Australian companies as “totally inadequate,” 
“under-developed,” “reactive and piecemeal,” “non-strategic,” “pretty 
poor,” and “deeply deficient.” They expressed concerns that companies were 
focusing narrowly and not adequately addressing all forms of climate risk 
and that they were not integrating and quantifying risks into financial 
statements as recommended by the TCFD.200 However, they also noted that 
climate risk disclosure was in its infancy and evolving quickly; concerns 
about the quality and usefulness of climate disclosures have led to a debate 
like that in the United States over whether there is a need for more 
standardization and higher levels of regulation in this sphere.201 
While there is a strong momentum towards Australian companies and 
regulators embracing the TCFD framework as a basis for disclosures, it is 
not clear that these new disclosure expectations are driving companies to 
respond to climate change risks and opportunities more quickly or to transition 
to cleaner energy practices. Early experimentation with scenario analysis by 
companies (a key recommendation of the TCFD) shows a tendency for even 
highly exposed companies to portray their business-as-usual prospects 
favorably, despite the associated risks, often suggesting that near-to-medium 
term prospects are strong for highly climate-damaging products and 
operations (e.g., fossil fuel exploration and development).    
In interviews, investors expressed some disappointment that such 
climate risk-exposed companies using Paris Agreement-compliant scenario 
analysis—an approach recommended by the TCFD202—were still reporting 
no negative impact of climate change on their businesses.203 Subsequent 
surveys of company reporting confirm these problems and suggest that there 
has been little improvement. For example, a Market Forces 2019 analysis of 
the public disclosures of seventy-two ASX100 companies operating in 
sectors facing the highest levels of climate risk found that climate risk 
disclosure across these companies remains “largely superficial.”204 For the 
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United States, this experience suggests that even if consensus can be reached 
around a particular voluntary disclosure standard over time, this still may not 
be enough to drive shifts in corporate behavior that support energy transition 
without greater standardization and specification regarding required disclosures. 
III. SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS AND ENGAGEMENT  
Growing shareholder activism and engagement on climate 
change-related matters specifically, and on ESG issues more generally, has 
a public and a private face. The public face is shareholder proposals, in 
which shareholders use Rule 14a-8 to include mostly advisory proposals in 
a company’s proxy and have their fellow shareholders vote on the proposal 
at the annual meeting.205 Shareholders need to follow only minimal 
procedural rules to have their proposals included, although companies may 
argue that the proposal should be excluded for one of thirteen specified 
reasons.206 The number of such proposals submitted in a year has increased 
substantially. The votes in favor of such proposals have also increased 
dramatically, from the single digits to an average in the range of 25%, with 
many proposals in the 30% or 40% range and some occasionally passing, 
most notably climate change proposals at ExxonMobil, Occidental 
Petroleum, and PPL.207 The private face of shareholder engagement is 
dialogue between individual or groups of shareholders and companies in 
meetings, phone calls, or emails. Private engagement with a focus on 
environmental or social issues has increased significantly in the past decade.208 
As seen in our earlier analysis, shareholder engagement aims to 
encourage a faster transition through inducing companies to shift internal 
resources to cleaner energy uses.209 This Part explores developments in 
shareholder engagement and the impact that they are having on climate 
change action. 
A. Legal and Institutional Developments 
The growth in shareholder engagement has taken place during a 
transformation of the ownership of shares in U.S. public corporations. To 
understand that engagement, one needs to understand that context, 
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particularly the nature of several major types of institutional investors. In 
1945, over 90% of the shares of publicly-traded U.S. corporations were 
owned by individuals; now, about 80% of shares are owned by institutions 
rather than individuals.210 This has the potential to transform corporate 
governance, overcoming the separation of ownership from control 
traditionally seen as the core governance issue.211 But whether or not it will 
depends on the behavior of institutional investors. After describing important 
types of shareowners, we discuss several important legal developments and 
then some empirical evidence on shareholder engagement. 
Socially responsible investment funds are the most obvious candidate 
for investors that could engage with companies to focus on climate change 
and other sustainability matters. Such funds screen the companies in which 
they invest based on specific sustainability metrics. A quarter of all dollars 
under professional management are invested in such funds.212 But not all 
such funds support ESG proposals. For instance, sustainability funds 
sponsored by BlackRock, JP Morgan, and Vanguard have been criticized for 
not supporting ESG proposals.213 
Another type of investor that submits ESG proposals are some public 
employee and union pension funds.214 Controversy surrounds pension fund 
activism. Critics see pension funds as serving special interests that conflict with 
the interests of other shareholders.215 Others counter that successful pension 
fund activism focuses on items that advance the financial interests of 
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large and small pension funds); Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate 
Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1023 (1998) (examining 
the shared interests between workers and shareholders). 
215 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance 
Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 795–96, 798 (1993) ("[M]anagers of corporate pension funds 
and financial institutions have other business relations with issuers that are thought to generate conflicts 
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NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 228–32 (2008) (for example, union and 
public pension funds using their position to “self-deal” and with management potentially becoming less 
concerned with the welfare of other smaller investors) . 
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shareholders, which can receive the support of other shareholders, and that 
pension funds decrease the collective action problem shareholders face.216 
A third important type of investor is big asset managers, including many 
index funds. Of these, the “Big Three” have become hugely important shareholders, 
with BlackRock and Vanguard each owning over 5% of the shares of most U.S. 
public corporations, and, often, Fidelity is also over that threshold.217 These three 
companies thus have pivotal voting power for close proposals. Some critics218 
have argued that the big passive investors face incentives that discourage them from 
activism,219 and significant evidence supports this view.220 Others dispute this 
criticism. Several argue that index fund managers do have incentives to engage in 
active stewardship.221 Significant evidence supports this counterview as well.222 
 
216 See, e.g., Schwab & Thomas, supra note 214, at 1023 (explaining that union-shareholder activity 
can benefit other firm shareholders); Bebchuk et al., supra note 33, at 885 (“[U]nion pension funds may 
leverage their initiation power to extract concessions for labor.”). 
217 Fichtner et al., supra note 210. 
218 Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493, 494 (2018); 
Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, 
and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2033 (2019); see also Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott 
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activities. Further, competition with other investment managers is typically insufficient to eliminate these 
agency problems. Finally, investment managers may be further influenced by private incentives, such as 
their interest in obtaining business from corporations, that encourage them to side excessively with 
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low costs. See Lund, supra note 217, at 510–11 (noting a lack of financial incentive, acute collective 
action problem, and difficulty with government intervention); Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 218, at 2046–
75 (detailing investment mangers’ incentives to underinvest in stewardship and be deferential to 
corporate managers). 
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their portfolio companies, they vote mostly with management, and they are not plaintiffs in shareholder 
litigation. Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 218, at 2066–2115. 
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414/2018, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3192069 (explaining that competition 
provides incentive for passive fund sponsors); Marcel Kahn & Edward Rock, Index Funds and Corporate 
Governance: Let Shareholders be Shareholders 13–17, 28–42 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working 
Paper 467/2019, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3295098 (explaining that 
shareholders of index funds can leave at any time and therefore there are incentives for passive investors); 
Michael Barzuza, Quinn Curtis & David H. Webber, Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund ESG Activism 
and the New Millennial Corporate Governance, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 1243, 1251 (2020) (detailing how 
index funds have demonstrated effective stewardship by activism in regard to ESG issues).  
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every year, and interacting with more activist investors by letting them initiate proposals then deciding 
how to vote. Fisch, supra note 221, at 49–51. An empirical study suggests index funds allocate resources 
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Zahra Filali Adib, Passive Aggressive: How Index Funds Vote on Corporate Governance Proposals, 
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Thus, some funds and individuals focused on socially responsible investing 
and some pension funds propose most climate change proposals, while the 
votes of the Big Three and a few others determine their success. How one 
evaluates both current and future shareholder engagement depends on how 
one evaluates the incentives and informational capacity of those investors.223 
Several legal developments have affected the ability of investors to 
pursue ESG proposals. Many investors and asset managers are subject to 
strict fiduciary duty under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 (ERISA), which provides that fiduciaries must act “for the exclusive 
purpose of [] providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries . . . .”224 
The Department of Labor interprets this language as requiring that 
fiduciaries may only consider financial returns and risks in making 
investment decisions.225 In a series of interpretive bulletins, the Department 
has seesawed in how much leeway fiduciaries have to frame sustainability 
factors as financial risks.226 More recently, the Department of Labor at the 
end of the Trump administration adopted rules that further limit the ability 
to consider ESG factors in selecting investments, although the Biden 
administration has announced that it is staying enforcement of this rule.227 
The Department’s guidance has also addressed ESG activism in 
shareholder engagement by ERISA plans. Here too the guidance has 
seesawed. Under the Obama Administration, the Department was relatively 
encouraging of engagement. Under the Trump Administration, the 
 
engagement on firms with high carbon emissions. Jose Azar, Miguel Duro, Igor Kadach & Gaizka 
Ormazabal, The Big Three and Corporate Climate Emission Around the World, https://papers.ssrn.com
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Pub. L. Working Paper, Paper No. 19-07, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3247337. A counterargument 
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adopted by any given company will affect the value of their whole portfolio, not just the adopting 
company. Condon, supra note 41, at 1. 
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strategies, threatening a proxy fight to replace incumbent directors should the board refuse. There is much 
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favor, see generally Bebchuk et al., supra note 36; for a leading statement of the arguments against, see 
generally Coffee & Palia, supra note 36. There is concern that activist funds increase shareholder value 
by diverting resources from other stakeholders. Thus, those who advocate policies promoting shareholder 
voice as a way to address climate change should worry that those same policies may enable activist hedge 
funds who could have an opposite effect. 
224 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i) (2012). 
225 Osofsky et al., Energy Re-Investment, supra note 4, at 618–19. It can be argued that this is an overly 
narrow interpretation of the exclusive purpose language, and that the interests of employees investing for their 
retirement should include their interests as employees as well. See Webber, supra note 214, at 181–211. 
226 Osofsky et al., Energy Re-Investment, supra note 4, at 618–19. 
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U.S. Department of Labor Statement Regarding Enforcement of Its Final Rules on ESG Investments and 
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Department issued new guidance stating that typically fiduciaries should not 
engage in activities that “involve a significant expenditure of funds . . . .”228 
If a fiduciary is considering engagement on environmental or social factors, 
that may well require “a documented analysis of the cost of the shareholder 
activity compared to the expected economic benefit . . . .”229 At the end of 
the administration, the Trump Department of Labor adopted a new rule 
further limiting ESG engagement by ERISA fiduciaries, although the Biden 
administration has stayed enforcement of this rule.230 The President also 
issued an Executive Order on promoting coal, oil, and natural gas which 
includes a provision directing the Department of Labor to review “existing 
Department of Labor guidance on the fiduciary responsibilities for proxy 
voting to determine whether any such guidance should be rescinded, 
replaced, or modified to ensure consistency with current law and policies 
that promote long-term growth and maximize return on ERISA plan 
assets.”231 Thus the Trump Administration acted to discourage ESG activism 
generally, and such activism focused on climate change specifically, but the 
Biden Administration is moving to reverse those measures. 
The other significant legal development concerns limits on the ability of 
shareholders to use Rule 14a-8.232 The SEC recently limited which 
shareholders can use Rule 14a-8. Previously, shareholders who had held at 
least $2,000 in shares or 1% of the securities were entitled to vote for at least 
one year are eligible to use Rule 14a-8.233 Under the new rule, shareholders 
can only use the Rule if they have held $2,000 in securities entitled to vote 
for at least three years, $15,000 for at least two years, or $25,000 for at least 
one year. These threshold levels mostly affect individual shareholders rather 
than institutional investors.234  
 
228 Memorandum from John J. Canary, Dir. of Reguls. & Interpretations, Dep’t of Lab., to Mabel 
Capolongo, Dir. of Enf’t, Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin. 4 (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.dol.gov/agencies/
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Also notable is a shift in the SEC’s interpretation of the ordinary 
business operations exclusion. Proposals that have met the procedural 
requirements of Rule 14a-8 may still be excluded if they fall within one of a 
number of exclusions given in the Rule.235 One of these bases for exclusion 
is “[i]f the proposal deals with a matter relating to the company’s ordinary 
business operations.”236 The SEC bases decisions on whether or not a 
proposal is excludable under the ordinary business basis on two 
considerations. The first is whether the matters “are so fundamental to 
management’s ability to run a company on a day-to-day basis that they could 
not, as a practical matter, be subject to direct shareholder oversight.”237 
However, a proposal is not excludable under that consideration if it would 
“raise policy issues so significant that it would be appropriate for a 
shareholder vote.”238 The significance of climate change protects most 
proposals on this point. The second consideration is whether a proposal 
“micro-manage[s]” the company.239 In several recent no-action letters, the 
SEC’s staff has allowed the exclusion of proposals on this ground where the 
proposals encourage companies to impose GHG reduction targets.240 In a 
new Staff Legal Bulletin, the SEC explains that the key differentiator 
between excludable and non-excludable proposals is “the level of 
prescriptiveness” of the proposal.241 Policy significance has not saved overly 
prescriptive proposals. In 2019, the SEC staff agreed with the issuers’ 
requests to be allowed to exclude climate change proposals 45% of the 
time.242 Here again there is some initial evidence that the SEC under the 
Biden Administration may change course from its predecessor. The acting 
chair in a speech noted she has asked the staff to revise guidance on the 
shareholder proposal process, and that this could involve reaffirming that 
proposals cannot be excluded if they concern socially significant issues, such 
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as climate change, just because they may include components that could 
otherwise be viewed as “ordinary business.”243 
Reflecting the growth of institutional investors, in the 2019 proxy 
season, environmental and social proposals submitted were down somewhat 
from the previous year but were still almost half of all proposals submitted 
(323 out of 678).244 Only a little under half (146) of those proposals went to 
a vote;245 proposals are withdrawn when proponents reach a compromise 
with the issuer. Average support for such proposals was 28%, as compared 
to 10% ten years earlier.246 Again, in 2020, the total number of 
environmental and social proposals submitted continued to decline (303) but 
the percentage voted on and number passed increased.247 Almost half went 
to vote in 2019 and 2020 (up from one-third in 2018) and a record fifteen 
proposals passed, despite a lower number of submissions overall.248 Average 
support was 27%.249 Informal engagement through dialogues with company 
employees, officers, and sometimes directors has also increased.250 A survey 
of 439 institutional investors found only 16% had not engaged in any way 
with companies on climate change.251 
There is limited evidence suggesting that ESG proposals can have some 
effect on corporate behavior. One study looks at 847 engagements on a range 
of ESG matters with 660 separate companies by a European investment 
management firm between 2005 and 2014.252 About half of the engagements 
were aimed at improving disclosure, and half were aimed at company 
operations.253 The activist considered the engagement file successfully 
closed 60% of the time, with success defined as the target company 
complying with the shareholder’s request.254  
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A study on index fund voting on shareholder proposals found that close 
shareholder proposal votes that pass have a 2.04% higher one-day abnormal 
return than those that fail, but this is driven primarily by governance 
proposals.255 A survey of institutional investors on climate change 
engagement found that in 71% of the cases the targeted firms responded to 
their investors, but mostly that consisted of simply acknowledging the 
issue—successful completion of a typical engagement is reported by only 
25% of those surveyed.256 
Thus, the evidence suggests that at least some shareholder engagement 
does succeed in both creating the desired change by the target and also may 
improve firm performance by some measures. But that appears to be driven 
largely by governance proposals, the “G” in “ESG.” Systematic evidence on 
the effect of climate change proposals is hard to find, which is not surprising 
given how recent their rise has been and how rapidly they are evolving. The 
interviews described in the following two sections thus provide an important 
way to understand better the impact of this emerging engagement on 
climate change. 
B. U.S. Interview Findings 
In our interviews with the fourteen U.S. participants, questions 
concerning shareholder engagement included how they approach 
company-investor engagement; how investors use proposals to pressure 
companies on issues like climate change; how companies respond to 
proposals; whether proposals affect company practices related to climate 
change; and whether their employer supports proposals to limit use of Rule 
14a-8. In the following sections, we describe some of the patterns we saw 
in their answers that provide a practice-based lens on some of the debates 
in the literature discussed above. 
All of our participants saw ESG matters as receiving a greatly increased 
degree of attention from both investors and company management compared 
to the norm not that many years ago. This was regarded as true both for 
shareholder proposals and for more informal engagement between investors 
and companies. For instance, a director at an energy company commented, 
“I’ve been briefed that some large shareholders say, ‘don’t call us we’ll call 
you’ because everyone is doing more engagement.”257 
Climate change was identified as one of the leading topics for 
shareholder engagement within the general rubric of environmental and 
social matters. Votes on these proposals are also increasing. As one 
investment manager at a non-profit foundation noted: “15% used to be a 
good showing on a social environmental proposal, and we are now getting 
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majority votes on climate resolutions, at both big companies, like Occidental 
or Exxon, and even smaller companies; [that’s] enough . . . to make 
corporate secretaries and boards pay attention.”258  
Participants noted that there is a two-way interaction between formal 
and public shareholder proposals, and informal and private dialogue. On the 
one hand, proposals often emerge after a process of informal discussion has 
gone on for a while. A sustainability officer at a food company described the 
process as follows:  
Typically for us, we’ve been engaged with a shareholder for 
some period of time before they even file a resolution. So, we 
will have had at least three or four conversations with them, 
explaining our position, talking about what we’re doing, and 
in some cases, talking about disclosure. There have obviously 
been cases where we’ve increased our disclosure of what 
we’re doing, which resulted in not getting a resolution filed.259  
On the other hand, sometimes a shareholder may use a proposal to 
initiate a conversation. A pension fund activist characterized the use of 
shareholder proposals as “really an invitation to engage” and “a way of 
trying to get the board’s attention.”260  
Our interview findings indicate that companies’ responses to receipt of 
climate-related shareholder proposals vary considerably. Some companies 
will engage little or not at all and either try to exclude the proposal or, 
alternatively, allow it to be included on the assumption that it will not receive 
majority approval. Other companies will engage with the proponents and try 
to assuage their concerns, either by convincing them that they are already 
behaving as the proponents wish or sometimes by changing their behavior 
to comply.261 There is likely to be a trend for more companies to move to the 
latter, more responsive camp, as proposals become more common and attract 
more yes votes, and as large, actively engaged shareholders become more 
insistent. As one securities lawyer noted, clients opting to do nothing in 
response to a proposal were increasingly “a minority of companies in this 
day and age; most choose to engage.”262 
As for informal engagement dialogues, these can be in person or on the 
phone. On the investor side, our interviews indicated that a growing number 
of investors are bringing up climate change in their discussions with 
companies. A sustainability officer commented that this is particularly a 
focus of smaller ESG boutique investment firms, but “increasingly, large 
investment firms or shareholders are asking us to talk about these issues, 
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[with it] typically [being] the ESG specialist from those firms that we’re 
engaged with.”263 
On the company side, in an engagement where sustainability issues are 
likely to arise, company participants will often include someone from the 
corporate secretary’s office or investor relations and a chief sustainability 
officer or another employee in the sustainability group. Directors are less 
likely to be involved, although they may join discussions with large 
shareholders. An investor-side participant from a company based in the 
United Kingdom, but with a U.S. presence, observed: 
In the U.S., our positions are much smaller. It varies, but I 
would say that the most typical combination of people who are 
on the phone is the head of investor relations or some sort of 
corporate secretary and often they will bring their internal head 
of sustainability, head of CSR, head of environmental strategy. 
There’s some content person who tends to be responsible for 
disclosure, and then maybe there’s going to be some lawyer 
on the phone who’s worried about disclosure issues.264 
Several interview participants on the investor side noted a growing 
practice of engaging with groups of investors rather than one investor on its 
own. The groups could be informal networks, or through formal 
organizations and alliances. A former activist at a pension fund confirmed 
this trend of “collaboration with other shareholders,” often as a way to 
overcome the capacity constraints of working alone.265 
Interviewees noted that the topics of both shareholder proposals and 
informal engagement may not seem immediately relevant for climate change 
but are nonetheless importantly related. For instance, a number of proposals 
now ask companies to disclose their expenditures on lobbying. One pension 
fund activist involved with Climate Action 100 talked about filing a 
lobbying disclosure proposal directed at uncovering situations where 
companies “state one position publicly while spending their money privately 
in ways that are inconsistent with their public[ly] stated views.”266 
Another common type of proposal, not explicitly about climate change 
but relevant for achieving climate change-related aims, calls for proxy 
access, asking companies to adopt rules allowing shareholders to use the 
company proxy to nominate candidates for the board. This can then be used 
to pressure companies to put persons on the board with significant 
experience related to the environment, and climate change in particular—an 
emerging focus that several interview participants noted. As one interviewee 
said, “It’s our strategy to try and elevate climate risk into the boardroom, 
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and if our boards aren’t climate competent then [proxy access] gives 
investors a tool to put new directors on the board who may be a little more 
sensitive to those risks or knowledgeable.”267 
As with disclosure, the ultimate question about shareholder engagement 
is whether and how it is affecting underlying company operations and risk 
management. Engagement around climate change on a widespread basis is 
still quite new and rapidly evolving. Changes to behavior may take time and 
further evolution of engagement. Moreover, it is hard to disentangle the effects 
of engagement from a variety of other factors that are pushing companies to 
address climate change. Perhaps for these reasons, it is hard to discern from 
our interviewees clear and hard signs that engagement has yet significantly 
changed company behavior, but there are some signs of early achievements. 
The reactions differed notably for interview participants on the company 
side versus those on the investor side. On the company side, the general 
reaction was that engagement may cause their company to more clearly and 
fully disclose what they are doing, but that they were already actively 
addressing climate issues before investor engagement, for other reasons.268 
Noting the uncertainty on this issue, one said: 
It’s always a little hard to say where it’s coming from, right? I 
mean the fact that at one meeting hearing you’re getting a 
shareholder proposal on this issue. Does that have some 
incremental increase in your interest in asking questions about 
it at future meetings? Probably. But I think a lot of that, what 
the board discusses and what the board reviews is still very 
much driven by management putting the agenda together of 
what they view as most impacting the business.269  
Interview participants on the investor side were sometimes more 
cautiously optimistic about the effects of engagement on behavior. They 
rarely identified specific effects, but they made two broader points. First, 
along the lines of the old adage, “you can’t manage what you don’t 
measure,”270 there is evidence of “incremental movement by these firms to 
(1) disclose more about what they know and (2) really start to think about 
internally what they do.”271 This was described as “a first step” and “a 
tracking mechanism,” with the effect that as “more and more assets . . . are 
tied to these environmental performance indicators and as asset dollars 
move, that gets everyone’s attention.”272 
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Second, investor participants expressed a view that engagement is 
changing communication and culture among directors and officers. For 
instance, one remarked, “I think we are changing conversations in the 
boardroom, which is healthy.”273 Another noted examples of “certain 
companies integrating environmental risk throughout the whole 
organization,” creating “a real culture shift.”274  
C. Australian Interview Findings 
Australia has a much more nascent experience of shareholder activism 
than the United States,275 but one that is evolving quickly and increasingly 
embracing activism with respect to climate change. In our twenty-four 
Australian interviews, we asked participants for their views on how 
climate-related shareholder proposals were impacting companies, and how 
this avenue compared to “behind-the-scenes” corporate-investor 
engagement on ESG issues.   
In Australia, investors have traditionally preferred to engage privately 
with companies, with shareholder proposals (more commonly termed 
“resolutions” in Australia) seen as a more extreme approach, which was the 
purview of activist organizations.276 While private engagement remains a 
major avenue for company-investor dialogue, paralleling the United States, 
there has been a steady increase over the last decade in the number of 
resolutions brought to Australian companies addressing ESG issues, and, in 
particular, a more recent surge in resolutions addressing climate change 
specifically. The latter have been directed mostly at energy sector 
companies, including large electricity retailers such as Origin Energy and 
AGL, resource companies and large coal miners such as Whitehaven Coal, 
Rio Tinto, and BHP, and financiers and insurers with significant exposure 
to fossil fuel investments such as ANZ, Westpac, NAB, and QBE.277 Three 
general trends are discernable: (1) generalist institutional investors 
becoming involved in co-filing resolutions with civil society groups; (2) an 
increasing sophistication of the substantive demands made in resolutions 
related to climate risks, for instance, to address disclosure of transition 
planning or lobbying that is inconsistent with Paris temperature goals; and 
(3) resolutions receiving a higher percentage of the shareholder vote at 
companies’ annual general meetings (AGMs).278 
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277 See generally AUSTRALASIAN CTR. FOR CORP. RESP., supra note 98. 
278 See Australian ESG Shareholder Resolutions, supra note 98; cf. Attracta Mooney, Big Australian 
Investors Under Scrutiny over Climate Change, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/de4
317c0-f8da-4ec5-85bb-337ddcdaaed1 (finding that big asset managers and pension funds failed to 
support any climate change resolutions at Australian businesses during the 2018–19 annual meeting 
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The legal framework for shareholder resolutions in Australia has notable 
differences from that of the United States, with more constraints on the use 
of non-binding, advisory resolutions. As discussed above, however, recent 
developments in U.S. practice to limit ESG and climate-related shareholder 
proposals may result in more convergence in the future. To bring an 
“ordinary resolution” to a company’s AGM in Australia, shareholders 
require a minimum of 5% of the votes or a group of at least 100 
shareholders.279 This threshold would be prohibitively high in the United 
States but has not proved to be the main barrier to shareholder resolutions in 
Australia. Rather, companies have declined to put these resolutions to the 
AGM on the basis that they unduly interfere in the board’s management 
powers.280 This interpretation was upheld by Australia’s Federal Court in a 
test case concerning climate change resolutions put to the AGM of the 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia.281 As a result of this restriction, more 
recent shareholder resolutions on climate change have been brought in two 
parts, with a first resolution seeking to amend the company’s constitution to 
permit non-binding advisory resolutions, and a second resolution presenting 
the substantive demands regarding the board’s management of climate 
change risks.282 While constitutional amendments require a 75% majority 
vote283 and are therefore highly unlikely to pass, the advantage of this 
strategy is that the board is required to put the resolution to the AGM. In 
 
season); see also FIONA DEUTSCH, DANIEL GOCHER & ACCR STAFF, TWO STEPS FORWARD, ONE STEP 
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279 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 249N(1)(a)–(b). 
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MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 93 (2019) (“Since Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co Ltd v 
Cuninghame in 1906, courts have held that if a company’s constitution gives directors the power of 
company management, shareholders cannot interfere with the exercise of that power”). 
281 See first instance decision at Australasian Ctr. for Corp. Resp. v Commonwealth Bank of Austl. 
(2015) 325 ALR 736; upheld on appeal in Australasian Ctr. for Corp. Resp. v Commonwealth Bank of 
Austl. (2016) 248 FCR 280. 
282 For example, substantive resolutions on “Paris Goals and Targets” and “climate-related 
lobbying” put at the Woodside AGM in 2020 were contingent on a resolution to amend the company 
constitution allowing shareholders to bring non-binding advisory resolutions: “The shareholders in 
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most cases, companies have also allowed a vote on the substantive element 
of the resolution and reported this vote publicly.284   
Our interviews with Australia participants indicated a shifting attitude 
to shareholder engagement on climate issues, with “investors . . . much more 
willing to use every tool available to them in the toolkit,”285 including 
resolutions and potentially also the divestment of shares if companies are 
unresponsive. When large institutional investors—often pension (or 
“superannuation”) funds in an Australian context—were involved in 
shareholder resolutions, this was often seen as a strategy to escalate 
engagement with a company that was failing to adequately respond to 
private engagement on climate change.286  
Investors voting on climate resolutions in an Australian setting demonstrate 
a similar variation of approaches to voting their shares as those in the United 
States. Some funds remain committed to more traditional engagement 
approaches and would be unlikely to vote against management except in 
extreme situations.287 Further, they would be particularly uncomfortable with 
supporting constitutional amendments as a way to effect change on climate 
risks. Others will assess each case on its merits and then make a decision to 
engage behind-the-scenes on the resolution or to vote in a certain way.288 
Some Australian funds, notably superannuation funds such as Local 
Government Super, have even taken the lead in co-filing climate resolutions.289 
Several funds also noted that their approach to voting shares differs between 
jurisdictions: in Australia, where they perceive good access to boards and a 
strong engagement culture, these funds are more likely to vote with management 
and not support a resolution, even though they may vote in favor of an almost 
identical resolution in other jurisdictions such as the United States.290 
 
284 In 2020, some climate change resolutions received new levels of support, e.g., resolutions on 
Paris goals and targets put at Santos (43.49%) and Woodside’s (50.16%) AGMs. Australian ESG 
Shareholder Resolutions, supra note 97. See also Angela Macdonald-Smith, Woodside to Face Grilling 
on Climate Action, AUSTL. FIN. REV. (Apr. 27, 2020, 12:00 AM), https://www.afr.com/companies/energy/
woodside-to-face-grilling-on-climate-action-20200424-p54n0x (with key proxy advisor, CGI Glass 
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288 Interview with AUS19 (June 6, 2018); Interview with AUS20 (June 4, 2018); Interview with 
AUS21 (May 30, 2018); Interview with AUS22 (Apr. 27, 2018). 
289 In 2018, resolutions put to QBE Australia (part of the QBE Insurance Group, one of the world’s 
top twenty general insurance and reinsurance companies) were co-filed by Local Government Super (a medium 
sized Australian superannuation fund) together with the Church of England Pensions Board and the Swedish 
National Pension Fund (representing $84 billion worth of assets under management). AUSTL. COUNCIL OF 
SUPERANNUATION INVS., CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING IN AUSTRALIA 27 n.10 (2018). 
290 Interview with AUS22 (Apr. 27. 2018); Interview with AUS24 (May 17, 2018). 
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Regarding the question of whether shareholder engagement, and 
particularly the use of shareholder resolutions, helps shift corporate behavior 
on climate change, our Australian interview findings revealed a similar 
divide to that among U.S. interviewees. On the investor and civil society 
side, interviewees expressed optimism that recent shareholder resolutions 
had produced tangible changes in the approaches taken by target companies 
to climate risks. But they emphasized that these changes were occurring in 
the context of ongoing private engagement and also emerging targeted 
climate change engagements being pursued by coalitions of investors, such 
as Climate Action 100+.291 At the same time, the overall response of 
Australian companies to the lodging of shareholder resolutions on climate 
change was described as generally defensive, often quite adversarial or 
dismissive.292 From the company side, participants did however report a shift 
in their approach to climate-related resolutions, including increased 
emphasis on engagement with investors on climate risk.293 Various factors 
affected the nature of the company’s response, such as whether resolutions 
had broader investor backing and the level of support for the resolution.294 
As one interviewee expressed it, echoing a similar sentiment seen in the 
United States, “even . . . five percent of shareholders voting against 
management is significant . . . when you start getting up around that ten to 
fifteen percent mark, things get very serious for a board.”295 
These findings suggest the Australian experience of shareholder 
engagement on climate change is largely tracking that in the United States 
even though the use of climate-related shareholder resolutions is a more 
recent phenomenon there. This is despite the significant legal constraints on 
the filing of ordinary shareholder resolutions in Australia. Indeed, these 
constraints seem to have spurred experimentation in Australia with 
shareholder resolutions that may offer useful lessons for U.S. practice. This 
includes more sophisticated substantive demands, such as efforts to expose 
whether companies’ lobbying strategies are consistent with Paris Agreement 
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temperature goals. The Australian experience also demonstrates the 
potential effectiveness of more informal company-investor engagement 
strategies in advancing companies’ responses to climate risk where climate 
change is an issue of concern for investors. This kind of engagement has 
been facilitated in Australia by the concentrated shareholding of large 
institutional investors, such as superannuation funds, in the ASX200.296 
Potentially, the United States may be moving in a similar direction with the 
growing influence of the “Big Three” and their preference for using 
engagement over shareholder proposals. 
IV. FIDUCIARY DUTY 
The final legal tool considered in this Article focuses on the fiduciary 
duties of directors and officers. Directors and officers have a duty to act 
loyally on behalf of their corporation.297 Some have advocated suing boards 
that have failed to adequately monitor and manage risks arising from climate 
change. Such suits aim to encourage a faster energy transition by causing 
companies to shift resources from dirtier to cleaner operations.298 To date, 
no cases seeking to enforce such a duty in a climate change context have 
been brought in the United States, but there has been discussion both here 
and more extensively in other countries, such as Australia, about the 
possibility of such suits.299 Even without such suits, many companies have 
revised their risk management practices to recognize climate change risks. 
This Part explores the law surrounding monitoring of climate change risk 
and how corporate practice has developed. 
A. Legal and Institutional Developments 
There is some concern that the duty of loyalty could inhibit 
consideration of sustainability matters like climate change because the duty 
 
296 ELLIS, supra note 95. 
297 For an overview, see Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Fiduciary Duties: The Emerging 
Jurisprudence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 133 (Claire A. Hill 
& Brett H. McDonnell, eds., 2012). 
298 Osofsky et al., Energy Re-Investment, supra note 4. 
299 Id. at 610–11, 635. See generally HUTLEY & HARTFORD DAVIS, 2016 MEMORANDUM, supra 
note 25 (explaining that directors should consider the impact of climate change risks on their businesses 
and failure to do so could lead to liability for breach of their duty of care and diligence); NOEL HUTLEY 
& JAMES MACK, MARKET FORCES: SUPERANNUATION FUND TRUSTEE DUTIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
RISK: MEMORANDUM OF OPINION (2017) (“[C]limate change risks can and should be considered by 
trustee directors to the extent that those risks intersect with the financial interests of a beneficiary of a 
registrable superannuation entity.”); KEITH BRYANT & JAMES RICKARDS, THE LEGAL DUTIES OF 
PENSION FUND TRUSTEES IN RELATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE: ABRIDGED JOINT OPINION (2016) 
(explaining that trustees have a legal duty to consider financial risks associated with climate change); 
CLIENTEARTH, RISKY BUSINESS: CLIMATE CHANGE AND PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY RISKS FOR 
AUDITORS (2017) (describing climate change as a financial risk and advising auditors to consider 
reflecting that risk in annual accounts and reports).  
 
2021] GREEN BOARDROOMS? 387 
requires maximizing financial returns to shareholders.300 However, 
addressing climate change often improves the long-term profitability of 
companies,301 and given the broad discretion granted by the business 
judgment rule, directors need not fear liability for addressing climate change 
as long as they plausibly link the issue to long-term profitability.302  
There is a more affirmative potential use of fiduciary duty. Suits 
enforcing this duty could become part of a new wave of climate change 
litigation. An early wave of litigation focused mostly on claims based in tort 
and environmental law.303 A second wave of litigation is focused on federal 
and state securities law claims, arguing to false and misleading disclosure 
by companies (mostly energy companies) that allegedly were well aware of 
the risks to their business models of climate change.304 
Our focus here is on a potential new wave of litigation based on state 
corporate law fiduciary duty. In 1996, the Delaware Chancery Court held 
that directors have “a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate 
information and reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate, 
exists.”305 Some argue that given the significant risks that climate change 
poses to the business of many corporations, this Caremark duty creates a 
risk of liability for the boards of such corporations should they fail to 
adequately monitor and respond to those risks. 306  
Any such suit would confront serious obstacles. Liability under 
Caremark is extremely unlikely. The Caremark Court called it “possibly the 
most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope 
to win a judgment.”307 The court said that “only a sustained or systematic 
failure of the board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt 
to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists—will 
establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability.”308 
In over two decades since Caremark was decided, only a few cases have 
even survived motions to dismiss.309 
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But two recent cases have increased the odds of success of a Caremark 
claim. In upholding Caremark, the Delaware Supreme Court specified two 
ways in which plaintiffs could claim oversight liability: “(a) the directors 
utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system or controls; 
or (b) having implemented such a system or controls, consciously failed to 
monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being 
informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.”310 For each of these 
two paths, plaintiffs have recently survived a motion to dismiss. 
In Marchand v. Barnhill, the Delaware Supreme Court overturned a 
Chancery Court dismissal of a suit against Blue Bell Creameries.311 After a 
listeria outbreak caused by Blue Bell’s ice cream, the court found the 
complaint adequately alleged the company had no monitoring system at all. 
The lack of a food safety monitoring system in a regulated company that 
only produces ice cream was critical to the court.312 In re Clovis Oncology, 
Inc. Derivative Litigation involved a drug clinical trial by a 
biopharmaceutical company. 313 Here there was a monitoring system, but the 
board allegedly ignored numerous facts that raised red flags showing that 
the trial failed to follow standard protocol and regulations.314  
Though these cases indicate some life within Caremark, potential 
plaintiffs cannot take too much comfort. They only involve motions to 
dismiss, and the courts emphasize the importance of the fact that the 
companies had just one product line in a highly regulated industry, so that 
compliance with those regulations was central to the business. 
Even more important for the prospect of climate claims, Caremark 
involved legal compliance oversight, as did those few cases which have 
allowed Caremark claims to continue. Plaintiffs have tried to extend 
Caremark to monitoring business risk. The Delaware courts have never 
accepted this extension, and their comments suggest great skepticism.315 
Some think this limitation to legal compliance is the appropriate function of 
Caremark.316 Others argue that monitoring business risk is functionally very 
similar to compliance risk, so that Caremark could apply to business risk as 
well,317 and some argue that Caremark liability should apply where boards 
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fail to supervise risks that impose serious social harms.318 But case law does 
not extend beyond extreme legal compliance oversight failures.  
Thus, if a plaintiff claims that a company broke a law related to climate 
change and the board failed to adequately monitor compliance with that law, 
Caremark and its progeny offer some limited hope, particularly if climate 
risk is truly central to the company’s business model and it either had no 
legal compliance system in place at all or the board ignored major red flags. 
But if the claim is that the board ignored risks that climate change poses to 
financial performance, a Caremark suit seems doomed to fail, absent major 
change in the case law. 
Even if the risk of legal liability is negligible, a threatened Caremark 
suit could still affect director behavior. Companies may choose to have 
aggressive compliance programs to avoid any chance of liability given legal 
uncertainty.319 Regulators encourage companies to have robust compliance 
programs.320 Reputational concerns may also encourage companies to go 
beyond the minimum required to avoid Caremark liability.321 
Oversight duty suits may have a greater chance of success in other 
countries. We discuss the situation in Australia below.322 In Poland, 
ClientEarth sued (as a shareholder) two energy companies, Enea and Energa, 
over construction of a new coal-fired power plant, claiming that the project 
posed unjustifiable financial risks in the context of rising carbon prices, 
increased competition from cheaper renewables, and the impact of EU 
energy reforms on state subsidies for coal power.323 A District Court held in 
ClientEarth’s favor, although on other grounds.324 In the United Kingdom, 
ClientEarth has written to fourteen pension funds asking them to disclose 
what steps they are taking on climate risk and threatening legal action if 
those steps are not sufficient.325 A prominent Canadian law professor argues 
that Canadian law imposes a duty on companies to monitor climate change 
risks.326 This may be an area where Delaware is less responsive to 
shareholders than courts in other countries. 
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Even without legally binding obligations, boards monitor business risks, 
and best practices have evolved rapidly. A widely cited comprehensive 
approach is the COSO Enterprise Risk Management Framework. COSO 
issued guidance for a framework on enterprise risk management in 2004, 
which was updated in 2017.327 In 2018, COSO and the World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) issued guidance on how 
the COSO framework applies to ESG risks.328 The guidance stresses that 
ESG matters pose financial risks to companies in the short, medium, and 
long term and that this understanding brings ESG risks within mainstream 
risk management processes.329 The guidance stresses collaboration between 
the board, executive management, and sustainability practitioners, as well as 
internal and external communication of ESG risks.330  
Ceres has recently issued guidance on board oversight of ESG issues.331 
This also recommends stakeholder and shareholder input,332 regular board 
discussion of ESG risks and integration into strategic planning,333 
incorporating ESG factors into executive compensation,334 and building 
ESG factors into both audit committee and other relevant board committee 
processes.335 Still, not all boards follow best practices. A 2019 PwC survey 
of corporate directors found that 56% (up from 29% in 2018) of directors 
say shareholders are too focused on environmental and sustainability 
issues,336 and 46% think climate change should either have limited or no 
impact on company strategy.337  
At both the board and management levels, a critical question is who has 
responsibility for monitoring ESG risks. The full board has some 
responsibility, but there is a need to have more focus at the board committee 
level as well. The audit committee is responsible for overall risk monitoring, 
but should it be primarily responsible for ESG risks, or should another 
committee be charged with that? Large corporations increasingly have 
sustainability teams. Should management-level responsibility be primarily 
with them, and to whom should they report? What role do other departments 
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such as compliance, legal, and audit play? There is a tradeoff. Giving 
responsibility to a specialized group will ensure someone has expertise and 
incentive to pay attention to climate change. But there is a risk of becoming 
siloed, leaving central decisionmakers out of touch. The COSO and WBCSD 
and Ceres guidances suggest some specialization but also much coordination 
between various departments, committees, and levels.338 
B. U.S. Interview Findings 
In our interviews with the fourteen U.S. participants, we asked several 
open-ended questions concerning fiduciary duty and risk oversight and 
management related to climate change. These included how climate change 
issues filter up to the board; the lines of communication and processes in 
place around climate change; whether independent advice is sought, and, if 
so, from whom and how; and whether they perceived a widespread 
understanding among U.S. directors about how fiduciary duties apply to 
climate change. We describe here some of the patterns that emerged in the 
participants’ answers. 
Although directors and officers are very much aware of the duty to 
oversee and manage corporate risk, the understanding of the role of climate 
risks within that duty is mixed. Investors tend to view the duty as 
encompassing climate risks, but when engaging with companies do not 
“hang their hat on the fiduciary duty piece.”339 Perceptions also vary by 
industry, which to some extent is appropriate. A securities lawyer thus noted: 
If you are an energy company it is very different. You 
probably have this fully integrated in your business and in your 
thinking. You just have to. But I think for the bulk of our 
clients that are in the manufacturing space it is still not. Margin 
is still more important than climate change.340 
Another interviewee, who is a pension fund activist, generally concurred 
with this view, commenting: 
A lot of boards are just trying to fend off a hedge fund or other 
short-term thinking which kind of contradicts any long-term 
planning that they would do. It’s another big elephant in the 
room. Unless the company is managing and thinking about the 
long-term, this kind of stuff doesn’t make sense to them.341  
For those companies addressing climate risk, our interview findings 
revealed a great deal of variation in how companies allocate responsibility 
for that risk, and ESG risk more generally. Some examples give a sense of 
 
338 COSO & WBCSD, supra note 328, at 13–21; CERES, supra note 331, at 8–27. 
339 Interview with US9 (Oct. 30, 2018). 
340 Interview with US12 (Dec. 6, 2018). 
341 Interview with US13 (Dec. 12, 2018). 
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the range of options. At a retail company, the board’s nomination and 
governance committee is responsible for corporate social responsibility 
issues, and there is a CSR management team.342 At a food company, a public 
responsibility committee handles reputational risk related to sustainability, 
there is a sustainability group, and a governance committee of top managers 
discusses risks of all types.343 Another company has a matrixed reporting 
environment, where the sustainability group reports to finance and legal, and 
sometimes to the board as well.344 At another company there are two 
sustainability teams and a sustainability executive advisory team.345 At an 
energy company, both the audit committee and an operations, 
environmental, and safety committee oversee ESG risk.346 
Beyond internal company structures, a number of participants discussed 
outreach to various stakeholders other than shareholders on a regular basis 
on ESG and climate issues. At a food company, one participant commented:  
[W]e’re engaged with quite a few NGOs, but campaigning 
NGOs like Greenpeace as well as operational NGOs like The 
Nature Conservancy or World Wildlife Fund or the Xerxes 
Society, who are actually doing things on the ground . . . . We 
talk to anybody who wants to talk to us about these issues, and 
in some cases we rely on their technical expertise.347  
An energy company director noted his company has an annual stakeholder 
meeting that is large and comprehensive, with the CEO attending.348 
As in the case of shareholder engagement,349 a number of interviewees 
discussed the emerging focus on having board expertise around climate or 
more general environmental issues. A participant who works as a consultant 
described this as “a growing trend.”350 A question is what counts as 
environmental expertise, with “a lot of reinterpreting people’s experience in 
that space.”351 As a mutual fund manager participant remarked, “It doesn’t 
have to be an environmental scientist that you’re sticking on a board, that 
has no relevant experience, but someone who just has a real appreciation for 
this kind of broader risk.”352 A securities lawyer noted that this kind of 
experience may slowly grow across companies over time, with a “ripple 
effect”353 as “you get the board members having been people who were part 
 
342 Interview with US4 (Sept. 20, 2018). 
343 Interview with US5 (Sept. 27, 2018). 
344 Interview with US9 (Oct. 30, 2018). 
345 Interview with US11 (Nov. 15, 2018). 
346 Interview with US14 (Sept. 7, 2018). 
347 Interview with US5 (Sept. 27, 2018). 
348 Interview with US14 (Sept. 7, 2018). 
349 Supra note 260 and accompanying text. 
350 Interview with US9 (Oct. 30, 2018). 
351 Id. 
352 Interview with US6 (Oct. 5, 2018). 
353 Interview with US12 (Dec. 6, 2018). 
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of an executive team that was spending more time on that.”354 One lawyer 
also noted that “some companies are starting to pay attention to how 
compensation affects the incentives to pay attention to ESG matters.”355 
No duty to monitor climate change risk suits have yet been brought in 
the United States, so they were not yet on the radar screen for most of our 
participants as a factor that might drive shifts in corporate behavior around 
climate change. However, several participants remarked that such a suit, if 
it were to emerge, would get a company’s attention. As one participant 
noted, in the litigious U.S. market, “the risk of a lawsuit gets everyone’s 
attention in a way that I think can trump anything else in terms of focus.”356 
C. Australian Interview Findings 
Directors’ duties under Australian corporate law are of similar content 
to fiduciary duties under Delaware law, although broader interpretations, 
and a “public interest” orientation of enforcement in Australia, potentially 
enhance the prospects of a successful lawsuit.357 The principal duties 
considered most likely to be a basis for finding liability in a climate change 
context are the duty of due care and diligence, and duties related to the 
disclosure of business risks.358 In our interviews with Australian 
participants, we asked them for their views of whether companies see such 
duties as extending to climate risks, and what response was being taken by 
directors, if any, as a result. The following sections first explain the relevant 
duties that apply under Australian corporate law and then highlight key 
findings from the interviews about how these duties are being interpreted by 
Australian companies in practice. 
For the duty of due care and diligence, under Australian law, directors 
must show they exercised the degree of care and diligence that a reasonable 
 
354 Id. 
355 Interview with US12 (Dec. 6, 2018). 
356 Interview with US6 (Oct. 5, 2018). 
357 As discussed supra note 93, the term “fiduciary duties” is used as a convenient shorthand in this 
section to cover directors’ duties, but in fact the duty of due care is not a “fiduciary” duty under Australian 
law as it is both a common law duty and an equitable duty. For a comparative discussion of fiduciary 
duties and public interest norms, see Jennifer G. Hill, Shifting Contours of Directors’ Fiduciary Duties 
and Norms in Comparative Corporate Governance, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Feb. 5, 2020), 
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2020/02/05/shifting-contours-of-directors-fiduciary-duties-and-norms
-in-comparative-corporate-governance. 
358 HUTLEY & HARTFORD DAVIS, 2016 MEMORANDUM, supra note 25, para. 51. This position was 
reaffirmed in their 2019 opinion, HUTLEY & HARTFORD DAVIS, 2019 MEMORANDUM, supra note 25, 
para. 2. Significantly, their 2019 opinion also gave importance to the 2018 IPCC report. IPCC, supra 
note 55, at 10–13.  The 2019 opinion also provided guidance that directors should be assessing the 
possible of impacts of (and steps to avoid) 1.5℃ scenarios. HUTLEY & HARTFORD DAVIS, 2019 
MEMORANDUM, supra note 25, para. 14. The Corporations Act 2001 also provides additional duties in s 
181(1): the duty to act in the “best interests of the corporation” and the duty to act “for a proper purpose.” 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 181(1). See also AUSTIN & RAMSAY, supra note 92, para. 8.065 (for 
discussion of these duties). 
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person in their circumstances would exercise.359 As in the United States, 
directors can raise a defense of “business judgment.” However, this operates 
only in relatively narrow circumstances where directors can show, inter alia, 
that they “inform[ed] themselves about the subject matter of the judgment 
to the extent they reasonably believe[d] to be appropriate; and . . . rationally 
believe[d] that the judgment was in the best interests of the corporation.”360  
This imposes a relatively high threshold for invocation of the business 
judgment rule compared to the United States.361 
Although Australia, like the United States, has not yet seen a climate change 
breach of duty suit against company directors, there has been extensive 
consideration of this possibility in two legal opinions from leading commercial 
law advocates commissioned by the NGO, the Centre for Policy Development. 
In these opinions, Noel Hutley SC and barrister Sebastian Hartford Davis 
outlined how the duty of due care and diligence would apply to climate change 
based on existing statutory law and case law interpretations.362 They concluded 
that, as a general matter, there is ample evidence that climate change is likely to 
pose potentially foreseeable harm to company interests in many situations.363 
As a result they advised, at a minimum: 
[D]irectors should consider and, if it seems appropriate, take 
steps to inform themselves about climate-related risks to their 
business, when and how those risks might materialize, whether 
they will impact the business adversely or favorably, whether 
there is anything to be done to alter the risk, and otherwise to 
consider how the consequences of the risk can be met. In 
complex situations . . . a director is permitted to and should 
seek out expert or professional advice pursuant to s189 of [the 
Corporations] Act.364  
The Hutley/Hartford Davis opinions have been described by ASIC (the 
Australian equivalent of the SEC) as “legally sound and . . . reflective of our 
understanding of the position under the prevailing case law in Australia in 
so far as directors’ duties are concerned,”365 thus amplifying their influence. 
Speaking at a climate roundtable in late 2019, former Justice of the High 
Court and Royal Commissioner Kenneth Hayne AC QC concluded: “in 
Australia, a director acting in the best interests of the company must take 
 
359 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 180(1). 
360 Id. s 180(2). 
361 BARKER, supra note 66, at 14. 
362 HUTLEY & HARTFORD DAVIS, 2016 MEMORANDUM, supra note 25; HUTLEY & HARTFORD 
DAVIS, 2019 MEMORANDUM, supra note 25. 
363 HUTLEY & HARTFORD DAVIS, 2016 MEMORANDUM, supra note 25, at paras. 14–33.  
364 Id. at para. 37. 
365 Price, supra note 26. 
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account of, and the board must report publicly on, climate-related risks and 
issues relevant to the entity.”366  
Further, commentators, such as MinterEllison lawyer Sarah Barker, 
have discussed specific circumstances where directors may be in breach of 
the duty of care and diligence in relation to climate risk.367 These include 
situations where there is either “[a] total failure to consider and govern for 
climate change risks in strategic planning and risk management,” or 
“[i]nadequate or deficient consideration and/or governance of climate 
change-related risk exposures.”368 Hutley and Hartford Davis themselves 
described the prospect of “litigation against a director who has failed to 
perceive, disclose or take steps in relation to a foreseeable climate-related 
risk that can be demonstrated to have caused harm to a company (including, 
perhaps, reputational harm)” as “likely to be only a matter of time.”369  
Such liability theories have been tested in the recently settled case 
against the REST superannuation fund, which alleged that the fund’s 
corporate trustee failed to act with care, skill, and diligence, and in the best 
interests of beneficiaries by not adequately considering the risks posed by 
climate change to the fund’s investment portfolio in the best interests of its 
members.370 While the REST case did not concern directors’ duties under 
corporate law, it tested the scope of similar trustees’ duties under prudential 
laws applicable to superannuation funds.371 In an initial procedural ruling in 
the case delivered by Justice Perram of the Australian Federal Court, his 
Honor determined that it was legitimate to characterize the litigation as a 
public interest suit as “[t]he case appear[ed] to raise a socially significant 
issue about the role of superannuation trusts and trustees in the current public 
 
366 Kenneth Hayne AC QC, Full Text of Kenneth Hayne AC QC Remarks to CPD Climate 
Roundtable, CTR. FOR POL’Y DEV. (Nov. 21, 2019), https://cpd.org.au/2019/12/full-text-of-kenneth-
hayne-ac-qc-remarks-to-cpd-climate-roundtable. 
367 In thinking about how the Australian duty of care might develop to promote action by directors 
to deal with climate change, a member of our Expert Reference Group for this research—Professor Ian 
Ramsay of Melbourne Law School—noted that the development of so-called “stepping stones” liability 
might possibly provide a pathway. There is now a series of judgments by Australian courts where 
directors have been held to breach their duty of care by allowing the company to breach the Corporations 
Act. See, e.g., ASIC v Avestra Asset Mgmt. Ltd. (in liquidation) [2017] FCA 497 para. 216 (“Accordingly, 
the necessary requirement for liability in such a case is that the director failed to exercise reasonable care 
and diligence in circumstances that caused or failed to prevent the company from contravening the Act 
and where it was reasonably foreseeable that such contravention might harm the interests of the 
company.”). The cases so far have considered whether the director is liable where the director allowed 
the company to contravene a section in the Corporations Act, but arguably stepping stones liability under 
the duty of care may extend to breaches of other statutes, e.g., environmental laws. For a discussion of 
stepping stones liability, see AUSTIN & RAMSAY, supra note 93, para 8.305.15.  
368 BARKER, supra note 66, at 14–24. 
369 HUTLEY & HARTFORD DAVIS, 2016 MEMORANDUM, supra note 25 para. 51. 
370 McVeigh v Retail Emps. Superannuation Pty Ltd. [2019] FCA 14. 
371 The content of corporate trustees’ duties is informed by both the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 
1017C and the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) ss 52(2)(b) and (c), 52A. See also 
HUTLEY & MACK, supra 292 (explaining law as it relates to superannuation funds and recommending 
that trustee directors consider climate change risk in their decisionmaking processes). 
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controversy about climate change.”372  The case settled on the eve of trial 
with REST acknowledging that “[c]limate change is a material, direct and 
current financial risk to the superannuation fund…Rest, as a superannuation 
trustee, considers that it is important to actively identify and manage these 
issues,” as well as committing to net zero by 2050 and reporting against 
the TCFD framework.373  
More recently, a law student—Kathleen O’Donnell—has commenced 
proceedings against the Australian Government for failure to disclose 
climate-related risks to investors in Australian government bonds.374 She 
alleges that the Commonwealth engaged in misleading and deceptive 
conduct, and that government officials breached their duty of care and 
diligence by failing to disclose any information about Australia’s climate 
change risks in key information documents for investors.375 The claim 
alleges that Australia’s financial position and the investment performance of 
its bonds may be affected by climate change risks,376 and that these ought to 
be disclosed.377 The case does not break entirely new ground,378 but it is the 
first to focus on the Government’s obligations in relation to sovereign bonds. 
Our findings from interviews with Australian participants suggested that 
growing discussion of directors’ duties and climate change—particularly 
through the Hutley/Hartford Davis opinions—has helped shift norms in this 
area such that the conclusion that duties apply to climate risks is now largely 
considered uncontroversial.379 As one interviewee described it, these 
developments are leading to “a slow broadening [of] understanding of what 
 
372 McVeigh, [2019] FCA at para. 9.   
373 Equity Generation Lawyers, MARK MCVEIGH V RETAIL EMPLOYEES SUPERANNUATION PTY 
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Government Over the Financial Risks of Climate Change, CONVERSATION (July 27, 2020, 1:55 AM), 
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financial-risks-of-climate-change-143359.  
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376 See, e.g., Paul Read & Richard Denniss, With Costs Approaching $100 Billion, the Fires Are 
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those duties and expectations are, and how current law would be applied if 
it was . . . tested.”380   
Despite growing understanding of the links between directors’ duties 
and climate risks, our interviews showed that actual practice within 
companies remains highly variable. Whereas directors of large listed 
companies—especially those in sectors where climate risks are perceived to 
be material in the immediate and near term—are increasingly likely to be 
well-informed and active on climate change, the same cannot be said of the 
broader directorship of Australian companies, particularly for those 
companies where climate risks are perceived as more remote.381 Participants 
also expressed the opinion that skepticism of climate science remains a 
prevalent attitude on boards of ASX100 companies.382 
When responding to questions on directors’ duties and climate change, 
many participants reflected on the longer-running debate over corporate 
purpose and the relevance of stakeholder interests versus those of 
shareholders discussed above.383 They noted the challenges for Australian 
company directors in moving beyond a focus on short-term 
shareholder-related interests and the tendency for directors to view climate 
change as a long-term concern, rather than a materially actionable risk to 
company interests in the near term.384  
For those companies that are considering climate risk, the way that this 
consideration is integrated into broader governance processes varies 
considerably, echoing some of the diversity seen in the United States. 
Company-side interviewees provide various examples of governance 
processes for ensuring board oversight of climate risks, including risk 
management governance processes, such as regular materiality assessments 
and reporting to the board by risk and audit committees,385 or sustainability 
committees providing regular analysis of climate risks to the board and 
developing company policy and position statements on these issues for 
board endorsement.386 Some companies have also developed formal 
processes for the board to obtain external perspectives on climate risk. This 
 
380 Interview with AUS6 (Mar. 22, 2018). 
381 Interview with AUS4 (Mar. 7, 2018); Interview with AUS6 (Mar. 22, 2018). 
382 Interview with AUS4 (Mar. 7, 2018); Interview with AUS5 (Mar. 2, 2018); Interview with AUS8 
(Mar. 15, 2018); Interview with AUS16 (May 24, 2018); Interview with AUS17 (Apr. 19, 2018); 
Interview with AUS18 (Apr. 26, 2018). 
383 See supra Section I.A. 
384 Interview with AUS6 (Mar. 22, 2018); Interview with AUS15 (July 11, 2018); Interview with 
AUS16 (May 24, 2018); Interview with AUS17 (Apr. 19, 2018); Interview with AUS20 (June 4, 2018); 
Interview with AUS24 (May 17, 2018). 
385 Interview with AUS9 (May 28, 2018); Interview with AUS10 (July 12, 2018); Interview with 
AUS12 (June 28, 2018). 
386 Interview with AUS9 (May 28, 2018); Interview with AUS11 (Apr. 27, 2018); Interview with 
AUS14 (Apr. 30, 2018). 
 
398 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:2 
may include appointing expert climate change advisors or meeting regularly 
with civil society leaders for input on emerging risks and responses.387 
Overall, the picture that emerged from the Australian interviews was one 
of growing understanding of the links between climate change and directors’ 
duties, prompting some new processes and consideration of climate risks, 
particularly by large, risk-exposed companies, but not yet causing a wider 
corporate behavioral shift. As in the United States, though, the potential for 
litigation—and personal liability for directors found in breach of relevant 
duties—was seen as a potential gamechanger. The general perception was 
that if, and when, litigation, regulatory investigation, or shareholder reaction 
around potential breach of duty to manage climate risks does emerge, the 
pressure on directors to ensure they are fulfilling their legal obligations in 
this area will heighten considerably.388 Given the broader interpretations of 
relevant duties and the widespread acceptance and high profile of these 
interpretations, Australia is a likely jurisdiction for the emergence of climate 
change breach of duty suits and a potential testing ground for their feasibility 
elsewhere, including in the United States.  
V. FUTURE POSSIBILITIES 
In this Part, we suggest legal reforms that could make each of the three 
corporate and financial tools more effective in driving behavioral change. 
These suggestions draw upon experiences with use of those tools to date 
and interviewees’ reflections upon them. In Section A, we provide a 
general framework for potential legal reforms. Then in Sections B through 
D we apply that framework to disclosure, shareholder engagement, and 
fiduciary duty, respectively. 
A. Framework for Reform 
The introduction outlined the varying positions that corporate 
governance and environmental law scholars take towards the role of 
non-shareholder interests in corporations. The middle-ground approach that 
guides most corporate climate activism accepts shareholder primacy, but 
argues that the long-term profitability of many corporations is increasingly 
impacted by climate change, so that tools focused on shareholder interests 
can be effectively used.389 Critics from one side argue that climate change 
does not yet matter enough within the time horizon of stock markets; 
corporations focused on profitability therefore are not promising targets for 
 
387 Interview with AUS9 (May 28, 2018); Interview with AUS11 (Apr. 27, 2018); Interview with 
AUS15 (July 11, 2018). 
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climate change activists, so we should focus on other forms of regulation.390 
Critics from another side argue that, as currently constructed, corporations 
are indeed unlikely to respond effectively to climate change, but corporate 
law should be reconstructed to require corporations to consider the public 
interest in addressing the issue.391 
The analysis of Parts II through IV, drawing on our interviews, provides 
support for each position. Those skeptical about the ability of corporations 
to address climate change can point to the lack of clear progress in changing 
corporate behavior despite the great attention being paid to disclosure and 
shareholder engagement.392 We see a central truth here: activists should not 
fool themselves about the potential for these corporate governance tools to 
save the day. Other forms of regulation are much more important. For-profit 
corporations are not designed to solve a long-term, planet-wide, collective 
action problem like climate change. 
Those advocating for deep reform of corporate law can flip the script on 
what to infer from the limited results of corporation-focused activism. Given 
the ongoing failure of governments to seriously respond to climate change, 
the urgency of addressing climate change, and the central role that 
corporations play in the economy, if corporations as currently constituted 
are not up to the task, we need to reconstitute them. 
Those advocating the middle path of working within corporations under 
current law and institutions can argue that our results are not so definitive 
and dire. The disclosure and engagement initiatives described here are still 
new. Even now there are glimmerings of changed behavior, and many investors 
told us that as disclosure and proposals become more sophisticated and 
widespread and have time to take root, we can expect to see more change.393 
We have much sympathy for the stakeholder approach. The limitations 
of existing corporations and corporate law are great, and the need for drastic, 
fast responses to the threat to our climate is greater. In our discussion below 
for each of the three legal tools, we will begin by sketching how corporate 
or securities law would respond if we adopted an aggressive, legally binding 
stakeholder theory of the corporation. If environmental law does not 
transform soon, it may be that anything short of such a fundamental shift in 
corporations will be inadequate to our situation. 
And yet that fundamental shift in corporations and corporate law is 
unlikely to occur. So, we fall back on proposals that build upon existing 
corporate and securities law and initiatives as described in Parts II through 
IV. We suggest ways that these can be strengthened. These more pragmatic 
proposals will have less effect than adopting the stakeholder-focused 
proposals, but they are more feasible. Still, the stakeholder proposals are not 
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merely a dream: they help shape our more pragmatic proposals, so that our 
suggestions push the shareholder-focused approach closer to the stakeholder 
view of the world. 
Throughout this analysis, we consider how U.S. strategies might learn 
from the Australian experience. Because the jurisdictions have fundamental 
similarities, even with differences in the details of law and implementation, 
there are possibilities for the U.S. approach to borrow from the most 
effective Australian strategies. 
B. Disclosure 
Current initiatives have modestly increased disclosure in mandatory 
securities filings and greatly increased the use of voluntary sustainability 
reports.394 Much work has been done to devise reporting frameworks,395 but 
the lack of a common framework in the United States makes reports hard to 
compare, and the voluntary nature of most reporting leads to vagueness and 
cherry-picking of positive news.396 Australia, in this respect, provides an 
interesting model for the United States because of its more consistent use of 
one standard for disclosure.397  
These weaknesses, as well as the siloing of voluntary disclosure from 
the securities disclosure process that involves more central decisionmakers 
and formal audit and oversight, keep disclosure from having the effect on 
operations that it could in the United States.398 The time has come for 
strengthened required disclosure. 
An aggressive U.S. stakeholder-focused disclosure initiative would 
focus on a range of ESG issues, not just climate change. Investors, 
customers, and employees are currently focusing on a wide range of ESG 
issues, and many of the voluntary initiatives, like GRI and SASB, cover 
issues beyond climate change.399 A coalition of groups on a range of issues 
would be more likely to prevail politically. At least portions of the disclosure 
requirements would need to be rules rather than standards, both to ensure 
greater comparability across companies and to make it harder to greenwash. 
Disclosure could occur in separate sustainability reports rather than 
securities documents, but would be subject to similar anti-fraud rules, both 
increasing the accuracy of the disclosure and forcing companies to devote 
greater and higher-level attention to collecting the information.400 The 
materiality of what information needs to be disclosed would be judged by 
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more than the effect on financial performance.401 Such an approach would 
echo reforms being pursued in the EU through the elaboration of guidelines 
under its Non-Financial Reporting Directive. 
An important element of climate disclosure would discuss the impact of 
how a concerted effort to respond to climate change would affect the 
disclosing company. The two-degree scenario analysis of TCFD and many 
shareholder proposals in Australia and the United States points the way, as 
does the recent French law requiring companies to disclose how their 
company would contribute to meeting GHG emissions and clean energy 
targets set in the law.402 However, early TCFD analyses by Australian 
companies still tend to self-select favorable scenarios on which to report.403 
Such a requirement would need to be created by legislation, a major 
obstacle in deadlocked U.S. politics. It would also require the creation of a 
new administrative agency to implement and enforce the required 
disclosure.404 Corporate opposition would likely be strong, and the prospects 
of passing such legislation do not appear great. There are also considerable 
potential costs. Precise disclosure rules are difficult to create for many ESG 
topics, and what topics really matter may vary significantly over time, with 
the legal disclosure framework not reacting quickly. Thus, even if a 
stakeholder-focused system of ESG disclosures were politically feasible, its 
desirability would be debatable. 
A more modest approach working within existing securities law would 
be more feasible and less risky. If new disclosure rules can be crafted within 
the authority of existing statutes, then all that would be required is action by 
the SEC. Several options are possible within existing securities law. 
Most modestly, the SEC could provide greater guidance as to how 
climate change fits within current disclosure requirements. The SEC 
provided some guidance in 2010,405 but that could be updated and expanded. 
For instance, it could suggest that companies describe risks related to what 
Michael Vanderbergh calls “private environmental governance”—e.g., 
when Walmart commits to reducing carbon emissions in the products it sells, 
its suppliers with high emissions face a potentially serious reduction in 
demand for their products.406 Tied to such guidance, the SEC could engage 
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in stricter oversight of how well companies follow the guidance. Australian 
regulators appear to be moving in this direction, having tentatively embraced 
the TCFD as a model for companies to disclose climate risks and recently 
advising regulated entities that they will scale up monitoring of climate 
disclosures.407 There is also the potential for greater regulatory guidance 
from Australian accounting standards bodies regarding how to integrate and 
quantify climate risks within financial statements.408 These steps provide 
important models for the United States to consider in its reform efforts. 
More aggressive is the sustainability discussion and analysis 
requirement proposed by Jill Fisch.409 This would require a narrative 
analysis of the three most significant sustainability risks that a company 
faces.410 Climate change would not be a top-three risk for all companies, but 
it would be for the companies that most significantly contribute to, and are 
affected by, climate change. The sustainability discussion is a standard 
rather than a rule and so would not help comparability as much as more 
detailed rules, but Fisch argues many common practices would emerge and 
help with comparability.411 
The most aggressive option would impose a new, more detailed set of 
rules for climate change and other ESG topics.412 Since it would be part of 
securities law, only information that is material to financial performance 
would be required, reducing costs of compliance. We suggest a “comply or 
explain” approach: companies that feel portions of the new required 
disclosure are not relevant to them could choose not to comply and explain 
why.413 This creates more flexibility and diminishes the risk of ill-considered 
rules creating high costs, though it would increase the risk of 
under-disclosure. The SEC could devise new rules from scratch, but the 
better option would be to adapt, at least as a starting point, one of the current 
voluntary disclosure frameworks.414 The rulemaking process would be a 
good way to sort out which framework investors prefer.  
 
407 See AUSTL. PRUDENTIAL REGUL. AUTH., CLIMATE CHANGE: AWARENESS TO ACTION 7 (2019). 
The APRA is also undertaking climate change financial risk vulnerability assessments. Summerhayes, 
supra note 192. ASIC has also stepped up its regulatory oversight. Media Release, Australian. Sec. & 
Invs. Comm’n, Financial Reporting Focuses for 31 December 2019, https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-
centre/find-a-media-release/2019-releases/19-341mr-financial-reporting-focuses-for-31-december-
2019/ (last updated Dec. 12, 2019). 
408 See, e.g., AUSTL. ACCT. STANDARDS BD. & AUDITING & ASSURANCE STANDARDS BD., supra 
note 187, at 2. 
409 See Fisch, supra note 21, at 956 (proposing an SEC-mandated sustainability disclosure and 
analysis in annual financial reporting). 
410 Id. 
411 Id. at 961–62. 
412 The SEC under the Biden administration has announced that it is reviewing climate-related and 
other ESG disclosure. Supra notes 140–41. 
413 Björn Fasterling & Jean-Christophe Duhamel, Le Comply or Explain: La Transparence 
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414 Supra notes 110–14 and accompanying text. 
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It is currently hard to say which of several alternatives is likely to win 
out.415 We suspect that SASB is the best option.416 It is adapted for 
securities-based disclosure, covers a wide range of ESG topics, and provides 
detailed, industry-specific rules. A downside of SASB, though, would be 
that it currently has less support outside the United States than some 
alternatives. As noted, Australia focuses on the TCFD.417 
Such a broad rules-based disclosure system would give investors the 
comparability they crave and reduce the tendency for vague, optimistic 
greenwashing. The “comply or explain” feature could lessen company 
opposition. Some companies might even support such disclosure, since the 
current proliferation of standards and information requests creates a 
dilemma for well-intentioned companies. New rules would provide one 
common framework and a level playing field. Though shareholder-focused, 
the disclosure would be useful for others as well. 
C. Shareholder Proposals and Engagement 
Both formal and informal shareholder engagement have increased 
greatly, with climate change a major element of that growth.418 It is not clear 
that this engagement has yet had a major impact on operations. But there are 
signs of positive effects, and as engagement takes root and becomes more 
sophisticated, its impact could grow.419 
An aggressive stakeholder approach to governance and voting might 
further enable shareholder voice, given the current use of such voice to 
promote ESG issues. Or it might not, given the potential use of expanded 
shareholder voice by hedge fund activists seeking short-term profits.420 What 
a stakeholder approach would distinctively do is give more voice to 
stakeholders, including persons or groups with environmental expertise. A 
direct voice in making decisions could have much more impact than 
disclosure or fiduciary duties.421 
The most extensive approach to greater voice would be positions on the 
board of directors. Senator Elizabeth Warren, for example, has proposed that 
40% of the directors on the boards of the largest corporations be elected by 
their employees,422 which, due to her presidential campaign in 2020, has 
brought greater public attention to this issue. The case for board 
representation of environmentalists is weaker than for employees. 
 
415 Supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text. 
416 Larry Fink’s most recent letter to CEOs committing to pushing BlackRock’s portfolio companies 
to use SASB may increase the salience of that standard. Fink, supra note 37. 
417 Supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
418 Supra notes 207–08 and accompanying text. 
419 Supra notes 268–69 and accompanying text. 
420 Supra note 223 and accompanying text. 
421 McDonnell, From Duty and Disclosure, supra note 65, at 81–82. 
422 See id. at 81, 100 (“[D]irectors are elected only by shareholders, and only shareholders have 
standing to sue for duty violations.”) . 
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Environmentalists have a less intense stake in the operations of a 
corporation, and there is serious question as to who would have power to 
vote for such a representative.423 But one could certainly imagine taking the 
environmental expertise proposals that are beginning to appear and turning 
them into a legal requirement. 
A lesser degree of voice would take the form of advisory councils. These 
would have no binding vote over decisions but would be regularly consulted 
by the board or officers on issues within their expertise. One could imagine 
either a general sustainability council with representatives of various interests, or 
different councils for different interests, with one focused on the environment.424  
Mandatory stakeholder voice mechanisms might have the strongest 
effects of any of the possible reforms considered here, but they would also 
create the greatest change in corporate structure, provoke the greatest 
opposition, and impose the highest costs. They would require legislation, 
making them hard to achieve. 
Working instead within the current corporate legal structure turns our 
attention to shareholder, not stakeholder, voice. Institutional investors have 
evolved to a point where shareholder voice may plausibly reflect 
(imperfectly) many stakeholder concerns, including climate change. Funds 
with a sustainability focus, along with individual investors concerned about 
such issues, are raising climate change repeatedly in both proposals and 
informal engagement. The big universal asset managers like BlackRock and 
Vanguard, with long-term stakes and broad portfolios, plausibly represent 
the public interest (imperfectly) in voting on those proposals, which 
determines whether they will pass. There are plenty of problems in the 
incentives and information facing the managers of such institutions, but they 
are enough aligned with public concerns to push for positive changes.425 
Several legal issues should be addressed to give more room for 
shareholder ESG activism. The ERISA fiduciary duty interpretations that 
limit the ability of fund managers to base investment and voting decisions 
on climate change concerns should be changed,426 and the new rules further 
restricting consideration of ESG in investment and voting should be 
repealed, as the Biden administration has moved towards doing by 
announcing it will not enforce the new rules.427 Ideally, ERISA could be 
interpreted or amended to allow consideration of the non-financial interests 
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to Shared Governance,  61 B.C. L. REV. 2419 (2020).  
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of beneficiaries.428 More feasibly, the seesawing guidance on incorporating 
ESG concerns into considerations of financial risk should return to the 
Obama-era grant of greater discretion. 
On Rule 14a-8 proponent eligibility, we suggest reversing the recent 
“reform.”  The recent SEC rule change increased the number of shares and 
holding period required in order to introduce a shareholder proposal.429 The 
old eligibility requirements did not need fixing. Shareholder proposals 
impose limited costs and serve a useful function. As several of our 
interviewees (even on the corporate side) noted, they provide a useful 
function of alerting managers to emerging concerns. Indeed, in this case, the 
U.S. approach to non-binding advisory proposals provides a useful legal 
model for Australian reforms.430   
The recent SEC practice of allowing exclusion of GHG emission 
reduction target proposals431 should stop, given the usefulness of such 
proposals.432 There is an easy fix. The analysis allowing exclusion has 
reasoned that the significant policy exception, which forbids exclusion for 
proposals raising significant policy issues, does not apply to the anti-
micromanagement rationale for the exclusion.433 That should be reversed,434 
so that any proposal that addresses a significant policy issue that is genuinely 
relevant to the company’s operations should not be excludable under the 
ordinary business exclusion. 
Finally, the literature surveyed in Section II.B.1, our interviews, and our 
idealistic stakeholder vision suggest a few shareholder proposals that seem 
particularly worth pursuing: 
• Reporting on targets to address climate change in accordance 
with a two-degree scenario. These are specific and 
action-oriented, with the potential to induce greater operating 
changes than older reporting proposals.435 
 
428 See WEBBER, supra note 214, at 184–88 (considering worker jobs in making investments, rather 
than a “returns-only” view of fiduciary duty). 
429 See supra notes 232–34 and accompanying text. 
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• Disclosure of lobbying and political spending. Addressing 
climate change ultimately requires major environmental 
legislation, and such proposals may reduce some of the 
political opposition to such legislation.436 
• Tying executive and director compensation to success in 
meeting climate change targets. Executive compensation is a 
critical tool for creating incentives to induce desired behavior.437  
• Requiring a director or directors with significant environmental 
expertise. Many interviewees identified this as an emerging 
issue receiving growing attention, and it is a move in the 
direction of a stakeholder approach to governance.438 
• Creating an environmental, or, more broadly, a sustainability 
advisory council. Many companies already reach out to a variety 
of stakeholders in various ways. An advisory council would 
formalize stakeholder engagement, giving it a focus, which 
could lead to more sustained attention from executive officers 
and the board. We have not seen such a proposal, but it (as well 
as the previous two proposals) would be a way of moving 
towards our more aggressive stakeholder engagement vision 
company by company, rather than by comprehensive legislation. 
D. Fiduciary Duty 
Emerging best practice in risk management incorporates climate change 
into the monitoring of company risk, but many companies do not yet follow 
that best practice.439 Caremark-style suits, claiming a failure to adequately 
monitor climate change risk, provide a potential path to push more companies 
towards better risk management, but such suits face large obstacles.440  
A stakeholder-focused duty to monitor would require that boards 
address severe risks to significant stakeholders and interests impacted by a 
company’s operations. Given the policy reasons underlying the business 
judgment rule, such a duty would, like Caremark, give boards very wide 
discretion in deciding how to design and carry out such a supervisory 
system. But the duty to monitor would go well beyond supervising whether 
the company is complying with the law. One of us has suggested such a duty 
in the context of financial companies following the financial crisis.441 A 
broad stakeholder-focused duty would make sense in the context of 
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corporations whose core governance mechanisms reflect the voices of 
multiple stakeholders. 
Such a duty seems extremely unlikely to be recognized by the Delaware 
courts. It greatly stretches Caremark and also reverses the core commitment 
to shareholder primacy. That commitment has, if anything, grown stronger 
and more explicit in Delaware recently. It is hard to imagine the courts 
switching direction anytime soon.442 
A more modest approach might be to wait and see if supportive cases 
develop in other countries first—the law elsewhere may be more open to 
climate change supervision suits than Delaware is.443 Once a plaintiff 
decides to test the waters in Delaware, the greatest chance for success would 
exist where a company has violated existing law limiting GHG emissions, 
or some other climate-related laws. Such a case could then make a traditional 
Caremark claim suggesting a failure to monitor legal compliance. Even in 
the wake of recent cases allowing such suits to continue, such a claim would 
face long odds, but it might have a chance.444 However, focusing only on 
cases generated by violations of existing environmental or tort law would be 
very limiting—much of the point of the legal tools considered here is to prod 
corporations to change even though environmental law does not require it. 
Thus, those proposing duty cases based on failure to address climate risk 
mostly conceive of climate risk as creating financial risk for a company. 
This goes beyond legal compliance risk but is less of a challenge to Delaware 
law than the stakeholder conception of risk. Still, such a theory would run 
up against the many cases strongly questioning whether the Caremark duty 
extends to the monitoring of business risk. But those cases do not quite hold 
that the duty to monitor does not extend to business risk, so the point remains 
open to argument, even if the chances of success are slim. 
To succeed, litigants would need to find a very attractive defendant. 
Climate change would need to pose a great and pressing financial risk to the 
company, and yet the company would either have to have no system for 
monitoring climate risk at all or be completely ignoring obvious and multiple 
red flags about such risk. An appropriate situation may be hard to find, 
especially given the current lack of regulatory risks posed by environmental 
and energy law reforms compared to the European context. Most companies 
in the industries most affected by climate risk are now claiming to do at least 
something about addressing such risk. It may not be much, but Caremark 
does not require much at all. Maybe, though, there is an energy company out 
there that publicly engages in climate change denialism; that could make a 
promising target. 
Over time, Australia may provide some helpful models for an approach 
because, as described above, it has a more promising environment for breach 
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of duty suits against directors. If that happens, its greater similarity to the 
United States than the European jurisdictions where the litigation has emerged 
to date may suggest pathways for U.S. lawyers working to craft an approach. 
CONCLUSION 
As explored in Part I,445 in both corporate and environmental law, there 
are those who argue for major reform of environmental law and express 
skepticism that tools focused on corporate governance can do much good. 
Our interview results in Parts II through IV suggest their skepticism has 
much justification. They are correct that environmental and energy law 
reform would address climate change more effectively. But we are skeptical 
about the pace of such reform, and our interviews do suggest that something 
can and needs to be done right now, with existing law and forward-looking 
corporations and investors, that does not preclude these longer-term efforts. 
Even if current approaches in disclosure, stakeholder, and fiduciary duty law 
are not yet advancing these goals substantially, we argue that—especially 
given the existing political climate—they form an important part of the 
regulatory toolkit that should be incorporated into strategic approaches. 
This Article therefore includes both major and more limited reform 
proposals. We suggest deep changes taking a stakeholder approach, which 
could create companies much more willing to address climate change than 
current U.S. public corporations. But since significant reform is unlikely to 
pass in the near term, we also propose more modest reforms working within 
the long-term shareholder value approach underlying most of the activism 
we discuss in this Article.446 The reforms that we regard as more realistic do 
not promise drastic, immediate change, and such change may well be 
required to avoid very serious consequences from climate change.447  
As the United States ramps up its ambition to address climate change 
under the Biden Administration through rejoining the Paris Agreement, 
extensive Executive Orders, and advancing legislation to support major 
investments in clean energy infrastructure, corporate and financial 
mechanisms are an important complementary tool.448 And helped along by 
relatively modest and achievable legal reforms, those efforts have a chance 
to have some real effects, if not dramatic ones. Given the long-lasting impact 
of GHG emissions, real and soon-achievable effects are worth pursuing as 
one part of a multi-prong effort of addressing climate change. Corporate and 
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financial law will never be the sole solution to the problem of climate 
change, but it shapes the decisions of companies and investors that are 
crucial to the level of global GHG emissions and efforts to adapt to impacts.  
 
 
 
 
